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HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND  YALE  UNIVERSITY 
A  Scorecard  for  Indexed 
Government  Debt 
1. Introduction 
It is  natural  for the  principal  and  interest  payments  specified  by  debt 
contracts  to  be  denominated  in  real rather than  nominal  terms.  Pay- 
ments  are naturally made  in terms that are meaningful  to the parties to 
the contract, rather than in terms of money  whose  value,  especially  over 
long  periods  of  time,  may  be  very  unpredictable.  Government  debt 
securities-bills,  notes,  and  bonds-that  specify  real  payments  are 
known  as indexed  or index-linked  debt,  since  their nominal  payments 
are linked  to the value of an official price index. 
The issuance  of indexed  debt is not a new  idea; it was proposed  and 
implemented  long  ago.  In 1780, the  State of Massachusetts  created in- 
dexed debt (Fisher, 1913). The notes specified "Both Principal and Interest 
to be paid in the then current Money of said State, in a greater or less Sum, 
according as Five Bushels of CORN, Sixty-eight Pounds and four-seventh 
Parts of a Pound  of BEEF,  Ten Pounds  of SHEEP'S WOOL, and Sixteen 
Pounds of SOLE LEATHER  shall then cost, more or less than One Hundred 
Thirty  Pounds current money,  at the then current Prices of Said Articles."l 
This paper was  prepared  for the NBER Macroeconomics  Annual  Conference,  March 8-9, 
1996.  The authors  are indebted to David Wilcox  for suggesting the topic;  to John  Ammer, 
Norman  Carleton,  David  Mullins,  Julio Rotemberg,  and David Wilcox for discussions;  to 
David  Barr, Creon Butler, and Mervyn  King for assistance  with  the U.K. data and discus- 
sions  about  the  U.K.  experience;  and  to  Andres  Lederman,  Michael  Rashes,  and  Luis 
Viceira  for able research  assistance. 
1. This text is from a plate  (Fisher, 1913, facing p. 454), with  a photograph  of a four-year 
indexed note allegedly engraved by Paul Revere. The notes were issued at a difficult 
time during  the  Revolutionary  War when  the paper currency was  very unstable.  After 
the  war,  in  1786,  at  a  time  of  intense  public  discontent  about  economic  injustices, 
culminating  in  Shay's  Rebellion,  the  remaining  indexed  debt  was  consolidated  into 
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Despite  the limited number of commodities  that they saw fit to include in 
their formula,  and without  using  the word "index number," they indeed 
created indexed  debt just as we  define  it today. 
In 1822, Joseph Lowe  advocated  for the first time a public policy  that 
long-term  contracts  should  generally  be  settled  in  terms  of  an  index 
number,  a "tabular standard,"  that is based  on a "table comprising  arti- 
cles  of  general  consumption  to  each  of  which  is  affixed  the  probable 
amount  of money  expended  on it by the public." His appears to be the 
first clear public  advocacy  of the idea  that indexed  debt  should  be the 
rule rather than the exception.2 His ideas were taken up by many others 
in the nineteenth  century, notably Jevons (1875), who  even  argued  that 
the use of indexed  debt in private contracts "might be made compulsory, 
in  the  sense  that  every  money  debt  of,  say, more  than  three  months' 
standing,  would  be  varied  according  to  the  tabular  standard,  in  the 
absence  of an express  provision  to the contrary."3 
The cause  of indexed  debt has been  taken up by many  people  since. 
The idea appears to make elementary  common  sense: there would  seem 
to be little point  in defining  long-term  contracts in terms of currency or 
precious  metals  whose  value  in  terms  of  consumption  goods  may  be 
very  unstable.  Yet the adoption  of such  debt by governments  has been 
painfully  slow.  Even today, the governments  of most of the major coun- 
tries of the world  have no indexed  debt. 
There are today,  however,  some  grounds  for optimism  that indexed 
debt is growing  in importance.  There appears  to be a new  momentum 
towards  the introduction  of indexed  bonds.  Table 1 shows  the dates  of 
introduction  of government  bonds,  indexed  to consumer  or wholesale 
prices, in various countries of the world.4 Three countries,  Canada, Swe- 
2. At least he is thought  to be the first to propose  indexing  of contracts by Jevons (1875) and 
Fisher (1934). 
3. Jevons  (1875, p.  324). Jevons  tried to anticipate  difficulties  with  the  scheme  but could 
think of only a few minor ones.  "It would,  no doubt, introduce a certain complexity into 
the relations of debtors and creditors, and disputes  might sometimes  arise" (p. 324), but 
he  doubted  that  this  was  a  serious  problem.  He  concluded  that  "The only  serious 
difficulty  which  I foresee,  is that of deciding  upon  the proper method  of deducing  the 
average  [index]." 
4. The table does  not consider  other forms of indexed  bonds whose  payments  are linked to 
a foreign  currency or to the price of a precious  metal.  Such bonds  are not equivalent  to 
price-indexed  bonds,  since there may be fluctuations in the real prices of foreign curren- 
cies or precious metals.  There are, however,  potential advantages  to these other forms of 
indexation,  particularly for small open economies.  Foreign investors may hold a substan- 
tial fraction of  the  debt,  and  they  may  prefer foreign-currency  debt  to price-indexed 
debt.  Moreover,  when  inflation  reaches  extreme  levels  in  a  small  open  economy,  a 
foreign currency tends  to replace the domestic  currency in daily transactions.  However, 
these  arguments  for other forms  of indexation  do not apply  well  to the United  States. 
Some  of the issues  of indexed  bonds  shown  in the table [with dates we  took from Page 
and Trollope (1974) and Jud (1978)] might have been for small amounts,  and not of much A Scorecard  for Indexed  Government  Debt * 157 
Table 1  DATES OF INTRODUCTION OF INDEXED BONDS WITH 
INFLATION RATES 
Inflation  rate 
Date of  Type  of  in year prior  to 
introduction  Country  indexation  introduction  (%) 
1945  Finland  Wholesale  prices  6.4a 
1955  Israel  Consumer  prices  12.3 
1955  Iceland  Consumer  prices  Ob 
1964  Brazil  Wholesale  prices  69.2 
1966  Chile  Consumer  prices  22.2 
1967  Colombia  Wholesale  prices  19.7 
1972  Argentina  Wholesale  prices  34.8 
1975c  U.K.  Consumer  prices  16.1 
1981  U.K.  Consumer  prices  14.0 
1985  Australia  Consumer  prices  4.5 
1989  Mexico  Consumer  prices  114.8 
1991  Canada  Consumer  prices  4.8 
1994  Sweden  Consumer  prices  4.4 
1995  New  Zealand  Consumer  prices  2.8 
Source of inflation  rates: International  Financial Statistics. International Monetary  Fund (consumer  price 
index) unless otherwise noted. Indexation  dates through 1972  are from Page and Trollope  (1974)  and 
Jud  (1978). 
a  Source: Bank of  Finland,  The Finnish Economy 1860-1985:  Growth and Structural Change, Government 
Printing  Center,  Helsinki, 1989,  Table  13, p. 278. This same source  indicates  that  in Finland  the cost of 
living index rose 99.1%  from 1939  to 1944. 
b  Consumer  prices in Iceland  had risen 102.7%  from 1949  to 1954;  source:  Statistical  Abstract  of Iceland, 
Table  12.5, p. 150. 
c In 1975 the United Kingdom  issued nonmarketable  index-linked  national  savings retirement  bonds 
("granny  bonds").  Marketable  index-linked  debt was first  issued in 1981. 
den,  and  New  Zealand,  have  introduced  indexed  government  bonds  in 
the  past  five  years.  Note  also  from  this  table  that  the  recent  introductions 
of indexed  debt  have  occurred  in countries  with  fairly  low  inflation  rates, 
comparable  to recent  inflation  rates  in  the  United  States. 
Table  2  shows  statistics  on  the  importance  of  some  of  the  indexed- 
bond  markets  as  of  mid-1995.  We see  from  these  numbers  that  indexed- 
bond  markets  are  of  some  consequence.  In  Israel,  indexed  debt  is  the 
dominant  form  of  government  debt,  reflecting  a  history  that  includes 
episodes  of  extremely  high  inflation.  Israel  has  issued  $25  billion  of 
indexed  bonds,  over  85%  of  total  Israeli  marketable  debt.  The  United 
Kingdom  also  has  issued  large  quantities  of  indexed  debt.  Although 
indexed  bonds  are  only  15%  of  total  U.K.  marketable  debt,  the  size  of 
U.K.  government  borrowing  makes  the  U.K.  indexed-bond  market  by 
importance. Diligent library  work produced no confirming  evidence of some of the 
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Table  2  SIZE  AND LIQUIDITY  OF SELECTED  INDEXED  GOVERNMENT 
BOND MARKETS 
Outstanding  Average  daily 
turnover, 1994 
Country  $ billions  %  of marketable  debt  ($ millions) 
Australia  2.3  3.8  21.9 
Canada  3.8  1.2  16.6 
Israel  25.1  86  13.2 
New  Zealand  0.006  <1  Small 
Sweden  3.6  3.2  Small 
U.K.  56.8  15.3  256.2 
Source:  Bank  of England  (1995),  Appendix  B. 
far the most prominent  in the world,  with $57 billion outstanding  and an 
average  daily turnover of over $250 million in 1994. In all of these  coun- 
tries except  New  Zealand  (the most recent issuer of indexed  bonds)  the 
indexed  bonds  account for more than 1% of the national debt, and in all 
but  the  most  recently  introduced  markets,  New  Zealand  and  Sweden, 
the turnover in these  markets is substantial. 
There  is  a  history  of  serious  interest  in  indexed  bonds  within  the 
government  of the United States, although  this has never resulted in any 
actual issuance  of government  indexed  bonds.  Until recently, the most 
visible  interest  in creating indexed  bonds  came from the U.S.  Congress. 
Legislation  mandating  the  issuance  of indexed  Treasury securities  was 
introduced  in 1985 by Senator Dan Quayle  (S. 1088) and Congressman 
Daniel  Lungren  (H.R.  1773). This legislation  received  widespread  sup- 
port in testimony  at hearings,  although  the bill suffered opposition  from 
officials of the U.S. Treasury. Lungren introduced  his legislation  again in 
1987 (H.R.  1330). In 1992, John Conyers,  then  Chairman of the  House 
Committee  on Government  Operations,  submitted  to Congress  a report 
on indexed  debt that argued  that government  issuance  of indexed  debt 
would  "contribute generally  to economic  efficiency, productivity,  stabil- 
ity, and equity."5 
More recently, the interest in indexed  bonds has come from within the 
Clinton administration.  Darcy Bradbury, Treasury Assistant  Secretary for 
Financial Markets, has repeatedly  stated to the press  since August  1994 
that  the  Treasury is  considering  issuing  indexed  bonds,  although  no 
5. U.S.  Congress,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  Fighting Inflation and Reducing 
the Deficit: The Role of Inflation-Indexed  Treasury  Bonds, U.S.  Government  Printing Office, 
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decision  is imminent.  The 1995 Economic  Report  of the President contains 
what seems  to be cautious  support for issuance  of indexed bonds.6 Laura 
Tyson,  former  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisors,  made 
similar statements  in 1995. The U.S. Treasury apparently has the author- 
ity to begin  issuing  indexed  bonds  without  any congressional  approval, 
but the decision  whether  to do so is something  that would  be left to the 
Secretary of the  Treasury, Robert Rubin,  who  has  apparently  made  no 
public  statement  on  the issue.7 These  statements  from members  of the 
Clinton administration,  coupled  with the recent tendency  of other coun- 
tries to issue  indexed  bonds,  make it appear that such issuance  may be 
closer to reality in the U.S. now  than at any other time since 1780. How- 
ever,  the  intense  recent  election-year  discussion  of the  federal budget, 
culminating  in the recent shutdown  of the U.S. government,  has proba- 
bly deflected  the attention  of national leaders from the issue  of indexed 
bonds.  We may hope  that they  will return to the matter in due  course. 
Since there are a number of questions  that arise in any serious consid- 
eration of indexed  bonds,  it is important at this time to review them, and 
give  a sort of scoring  of the  pros  and  cons  for indexed  debt.  The next 
section  of this paper gives  an overview  of the issues,  and we  then  con- 
sider three important empirical topics. 
First,  we  consider  an  argument  against  indexed  debt,  that it is  not 
really  much  different  from  something  that  we  already  have,  namely, 
short-term debt.  Short-term Treasury bills offer a considerable  degree  of 
inflation  protection,  since  their  rates  adjust  rapidly  to  changes  in  ex- 
pected  future inflation.  An investor  who  wants  inflation protection  can 
roll over Treasury bills; but this investor is exposed  to the risk of fluctua- 
tions  in  real  interest  rates.  We will  show  evidence  on  the  difference 
between  indexed  bond  returns  and  the  returns  on  nominal  bills  and 
bonds  that are already issued  by the U.S. Treasury. 
Second,  we  consider  an  argument  for  indexed  debt,  that  it  might 
lower  the  Treasury's average  financing  costs.  Since nominal  bonds  ex- 
pose  investors  to inflation risk, their yields  presumably  contain an infla- 
tion risk premium.  If the Treasury issues  indexed  bonds  it can expect to 
6. "More  direct and reliable  readings of inflation expectations  would be provided if one 
could compare rates of return on bonds whose yields are invariant  to inflation with 
yields on conventional  bonds (Box  2-5). Such inflation-indexed  bonds have been issued 
in other countries,  but not in the United  States,  and valuable  information  about  inflation 
expectations  has been obtained  from their yields." (Economic  Report  of the  President,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office, Washington,  DC, 1995,  p. 87). 
7. There  is a potential  problem  with the national  debt ceiling, which is defined in terms  of 
the face value of the debt; with indexed debt the nominal  value of the principal  is not 
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save this premium,  but there is surprisingly little work on the magnitude 
of the inflation risk premium.  It is not even  clear that the introduction  of 
indexed  debt would  reduce borrowing costs at all. In theory, the inflation 
risk premium  could be negative.  Moreover, some Treasury officials have 
argued  that indexed  bond  issuance  would  "balkanize" the market and 
reduce  the liquidity  of all government  debt,  thereby  raising borrowing 
costs.  We will  provide  estimates  of  the  inflation  risk premium  under 
various  assumptions,  and will  consider  the balkanization  and other is- 
sues  related to borrowing  costs. 
Third,  we  consider  the  argument  for indexed  bonds  that  they  may 
have some informational value because they make it easier for the mone- 
tary authority and other observers to impute the inflation expectations  of 
bond-market  investors.  We will  show  evidence  on  how  well  existing 
nominal  bond  yields  forecast inflation.  Moreover, we will consider  how 
indexed  bonds  have  helped  the monetary  authority formulate policy in 
the U.K. and other countries with liquid indexed-bond  markets. 
The conclusion  of the paper considers  the argument  that the creation 
of a substantial government  indexed-bond  market might have a "demon- 
stration effect," encouraging  the indexation  of private contracts. We dis- 
cuss  what  private use  of indexation  might  develop,  and what  might be 
the effects on economic  welfare. 
2.  What  Are the Issues? 
Much  of the political discussion  of indexed  debt emphasizes  the conse- 
quences  of indexation  for average  government  borrowing  costs.  At the 
time  of  the  1985 hearings  on  the  proposal  for Treasury indexed  debt, 
Federal Reserve  Board Chairman Alan  Greenspan  expressed  an often- 
stated concern: whether  the issuance  of such debt would  really save the 
taxpayer money. He stated that "the real question with respect to whether 
indexed  debt will save the taxpayer money really gets down  to an evalua- 
tion of the size and persistence  of the so-called inflation risk premium that 
is associated  with the level of nominal interest rates."8 At the same hear- 
ing, Under Secretary of the Treasury Jerome Powell argued that the securi- 
ties would  have to pay a high interest rate so as to attract taxable investors, 
and thus they  might be an expensive  source of government  finance.  He 
argued that the issue  of securities aimed at a small segment  of the market 
could  "balkanize" the market, reducing liquidity and increasing borrow- 
ing costs.  He stated "We believe  that the threshold  question  on indexed 
8. "Inflation Indexing  of Government  Securities,"  a hearing before the  Subcommittee  on 
Trade, Productivity,  and  Economic  Growth  of the Joint Economic  Committee,  May 14, 
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bond  issuance  is whether  they  would  be a cost-effective  instrument  for 
meeting  the borrowing  requirements  of the U.S. government."9 
In this paper, we do try to estimate the likely effects of debt indexation 
on average  government  borrowing  costs.  But we  do not agree that the 
analysis  of debt  management  is primarily a question  of comparing  the 
average interest  costs to the government  of different types  of debt. 
A single-minded  emphasis  on average  interest  costs  is inappropriate 
for  several  reasons.  First,  interest  costs  are not  real resource  costs  to 
society  like the costs  of the human  resources  used  in other government 
activities,  since  the  interest  is  really  just  a  transfer  between  people. 
When  the  debt  is  domestic,  the  only  direct effects  of higher  financing 
costs  are higher  transfers from taxpayers to bondholders  who  share the 
same government. 
To illustrate  this point,  consider  what  happens  when  all government 
debt  is  nominal  (not  indexed),  and  inflation  is  lower  than  expected. 
Then the government  is forced to make relatively large real payments  on 
its  nominal  debt.  The  government  in  this  situation  is  "losing" on  the 
financing  of its nominal  debt,  and it would  be paying  out less  if it had 
used  indexed  debt.  But of course  the government  is not a person,  and 
we  should  not  think  of  the  government  as  losing  money;  we  should 
think of what the situation means for real people.  If the government  uses 
taxes to make the payments  on the debt, then the taxes will exactly equal 
the  high  real  income  that  a  person  holding  the  average  per  capita 
amount  of  debt  obtains.  There  is  no  effect  of  the  government's  high 
financing  costs  on the average  person.  Those individuals  who  hold  (di- 
rectly or indirectly)  large amounts  of government  debt will  gain at the 
expense  of those  who  hold little government  debt.  Exactly the opposite 
occurs when  inflation is higher than expected. 
Some  economists  have  argued  on the basis of this logic that the form 
of government  financing  has  no  real effects  at all. By analogy  with  the 
famous  Modigliani-Miller  theorem  in  corporate  finance,  this  is  some- 
times  called  a Modigliani-Miller  theorem  for government  finance.10 Of 
course,  this proposition  holds  only under extremely restrictive assump- 
tions,  including  most  importantly  the assumption  that the government 
has  nondistortionary  sources  of  tax  revenue.  When  the  government 
must rely on distortionary taxation, then payments by taxpayers to bond- 
holders  involve  deadweight  losses. 
Even in the presence  of distortionary  taxation,  however,  the govern- 
ment should  not try to minimize  its average borrowing costs.  In efficient 
9. Hearings,  p.  104. The Congressional  Budget Office (1993) also emphasizes  the effect of 
debt management  on average interest costs. 
10. Sill (1994) is an accessible  introduction  to this idea.  See also Wallace (1981). 162 *  CAMPBELL  & SHILLER 
financial  markets  higher  average  returns  (or lower  average  borrowing 
costs)  can only  be achieved  by taking on more risk (or transferring less 
risk to investors).  If the government  really wanted  to minimize  its aver- 
age  financing  costs  it could  borrow  at the Treasury bill rate and invest 
the proceeds  in the stock market. Such a financing  strategy would  earn 
the government  the equity premium,  but the risk would be unacceptably 
high.  This illustrates  the point  that borrowing  costs must be considered 
in relation to risk. 
If average borrowing  costs  are not the key issue,  what considerations 
are important  for an assessment  of indexed  debt? There are several rea- 
sons  to believe  that creating indexed  debt will have real effects: (1) creat- 
ing indexed  bonds  may reduce the expected  deadweight  losses  of distor- 
tionary taxation,  (2) creating indexed  bonds  may affect incentives  for the 
government  to contain inflation,  (3) creating indexed  bonds  may enable 
the market to provide  important kinds of new information,  and (4) creat- 
ing  indexed  bonds  may  help  people  with  different  risk tolerances  to 
share their risks better. Of these four effects, the first three can be consid- 
ered from the standpoint  of a representative  individual,  as if all people 
were  the  same,  while  the fourth depends  on heterogeneity  across peo- 
ple.  Let us consider  these  four effects in turn. 
2.1 EFFECTS  ON TAX  DISTORTIONS 
As Barro (1995) has emphasized,  an important consideration  in deciding 
the structure of government  debt is that the distortionary effects of taxa- 
tion should  be spread as evenly  as possible  over time and across states of 
nature.  This is the appropriate way  for a government  relying  on distor- 
tionary  taxation to trade off the risk and return of alternative financing 
strategies. 
With nominal  debt, changes  in the price level can cause changes  in the 
real debt payments  that must be financed  by taxes. Barro argues that in 
ideal economies  where  there are no random fluctuations  in government 
financing  needs  as  would  be  caused  by  wars  or other  exigencies,  the 
ideal  form  of  government  debt  would  be  indexed  consols,  since  even 
when  inflation is uncertain these  consols  provide  a uniform and perpet- 
ual stream of real payments,  a stream of real payments  that is maximally 
smoothed.l 
11. See Barro  (1995).  There are some potential arguments  for nominal debt based on the 
possibility  that inflation  shocks are related  to real shocks that individuals  face, so that 
nominal debt can serve as an insurance  medium that cushions the effects of these real 
shocks; see Bohn (1988).  If the relation  between inflation  shocks and real shocks is not 
reliable, however, it would be better to insure directly against the real shocks; see 
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2.2.  INCENTIVE  EFFECTS  ON THE  GOVERNMENT 
The inflation rate itself is not exogenous  but is the outcome  of a political 
process.  Indexed  debt financing  can matter if it changes  the incentives 
for the government  to create or tolerate inflation. Economists have identi- 
fied a variety of mechanisms  by which  this may occur. Most obviously, 
the  use  of  indexed  debt  removes  the  incentive  for the  government  to 
erode  the real value  of its obligations  by creating inflation.  Along  these 
lines,  Margaret Thatcher  argued  that  index-linked  gilts  (U.K.  govern- 
ment bonds)  were  a "sleeping  policeman"  that helped  control inflation, 
by creating  a situation  in which  the  government  would  have  to face a 
large  interest  expense  if it ever  allowed  inflation  to pick up.12 On  the 
other hand,  the use of indexed  debt reduces political opposition  to infla- 
tion on the part of government  bondholders,  which  may be a moderat- 
ing influence  on inflation in some countries. 
2.3 EFFECTS  ON PUBLIC  INFORMATION 
Possibly  more  relevant  in  the  United  States  and  other  countries  with 
moderate debt burdens  and inflation rates, the existence  of both nominal 
and  indexed  debt  gives  the  monetary  authority  a measure  of  market 
expectations  of  future  inflation.  This  can be  used  to  fend  off political 
pressure  for excessively  expansionary  monetary policy during periods of 
temporarily low inflation.  At such times the media and politicians have a 
tendency  to proclaim that "inflation is dead" and to push  for monetary 
stimulus  of  the  economy;  in  resisting  such  arguments  the  monetary 
authority  may  find  that  market-based  forecasts  of  inflation  are  more 
effective  than  econometric  forecasts  generated  by  its  own  staff econo- 
mists. 
2.4 EFFECTS  ON RISK  SHARING  AMONG  HETEROGENEOUS 
INDIVIDUALS 
From the  standpoint  of theoretical  finance,  the creation of government 
indexed  debt may fill an important  gap.  If the existence  of government 
indexed  debt  has  a demonstration  effect  that encourages  private  issu- 
ance of indexed  debt as well,  then a liquid market for risk-free real debt 
may develop,  giving  society a true "risk-free interest rate." 
Creating a liquid market for indexed  debt of course does not eliminate 
the fundamental  risk that society faces, the risk that the economy  will or 
will  not be  as productive  as expected.  We cannot  all just invest  in the 
risk-free  rate  and  thereby  all  be  completely  insulated  from  real  risk; 
12. See Steve Hanke and Alan Walters,  "Sleeping  Policeman,"  Forbes,  May 9, 1994,  p. 217. 
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somebody  has to bear the residual risk. But riskless debt does provide  a 
mechanism  by which  society can offer a riskless income to some people. 
If there  is  a  market  for riskless  debt,  then  one  would  expect  it to  be 
priced in such a way that the expected  riskless income  from investing  in 
these  assets  is lower  than the income  one  could  obtain if one  accepted 
some  risk,  so  that only  the more risk-averse  people  will choose  to live 
with  the lower income  stream. 
In other  words,  a risk-free real asset  plays  a central role in the  risk- 
sharing  arrangements  of  an ideal  economy.  According  to  the  Capital- 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), relatively risk-averse investors would  hold 
investments  in  the  risk-free asset  and  the  market portfolio,  while  less 
risk-averse investors  would  short the risk-free asset and buy more of the 
market portfolio.  The result of creating the risk-free asset can be a more 
efficient allocation of risk. In some theoretical formulations,  the creation 
of the  risk-free asset  is of truly fundamental  significance.  Geanakoplos 
and Shubik (1990) have shown  that under certain idealized assumptions, 
the creation of a single  market-the  market for the risk-free asset-will 
achieve  full Pareto optimality  even  when  markets are very incomplete. 
Even under less restrictive assumptions  than are in place in their model, 
we would  expect important welfare gains from the creation of a risk-free 
real asset. 
This effect of the creation of indexed  debt relies on there being differ- 
ences  across people  in their concerns  about risk. Some may doubt  that 
such  heterogeneity  is important.  For example,  Barsky et al.  (1995) use 
survey  data to study  individual  differences  in risk tolerance  and relate 
them  to  differences  in  economic  behavior;  they  find  only  rather small 
differences  in  risk tolerance  that  are confirmed  by  differences  in  eco- 
nomic behavior.  But there certainly are differences across people,  even if 
not captured by the methods  of Barsky et al., that would  imply that some 
people  are very  vulnerable  to  income  fluctuations.  For example,  low- 
income  retired people,  or people  who  find it difficult to understand  the 
issues  of  investing  in  risky  assets  whose  prospects  are very  hard  to 
define,  may be more risk-averse,  and these  people  may benefit from the 
existence  of  indexed  bonds.  They  would  benefit  just  as  some  people 
today benefit  from savings  and insurance  institutions  that protect them 
from various uncertainties. 
3.  How Different  Are Indexed  Bonds? 
In the United  States,  short-term nominal bonds  are similar to short-term 
indexed  bonds,  because,  in  most  of  U.S.  history,  there  has  been  little 
inflation uncertainty  at a horizon of a month or two. Long-term nominal- A Scorecard  for  Indexed  Government  Debt  * 165 
bond  returns  are primarily driven  by  news  about  future  inflation,  but 
this is not the case for short-term nominal bonds  (Campbell and Ammer, 
1993). In fact, it is common  in empirical finance  to use  the return on a 
nominal  U.S.  Treasury bill as a proxy  for the  return on  a riskless  real 
asset.  Hence,  some  argue,  there is really no need  to issue  indexed  gov- 
ernment  bonds,  because  we  already  have  short-term  instruments  for 
which  inflation  risk is  small; the  riskless  real asset  that is  needed  for 
effective  risk-sharing already exists. 
Many  investors,  however,  have  longer  horizons  than  one  or  two 
months.  An  investor  seeking  an asset  that is riskless  in real terms at a 
long  horizon  can roll over  short-term  nominal  debt,  but the returns on 
this rollover strategy are risky because  they are exposed  to variations in 
real interest  rates. 
Long-term  indexed  bonds  are different  from  short-term  nominal  or 
indexed  bonds,  because  they  respond  differently  to  real-interest-rate 
shocks.  Over  a horizon  of one  month,  a shock  to expected  future  real 
interest rates will cause a capital loss on a long-term indexed bond (say, a 
10-year zero-coupon  indexed  bond)  but will  not  affect the  return on  a 
one-month  Treasury bill or indexed  bill. Over a horizon  of 10 years,  the 
return on a 10-year indexed  bond  is known  in advance  and will not be 
affected  by  real-interest-rate  variation,  whereas  the  return  on  rolling 
over Treasury bills or indexed  bills will be sensitive  to real interest rates. 
In judging  the  importance  of indexed  debt,  it is vital  to know  how 
large is this  difference  between  short-term debt and long-term  indexed 
bonds.  To address  this  question,  we  explore  the  historical evidence  in 
several different ways. 
3.1 HYPOTHETICAL  INDEXED  BONDS  IN THE  UNITED  STATES 
In the  United  States,  of  course,  indexed  debt  has  not  been  issued  in 
modem  times.  This  makes  it hard  to  know  how  indexed-bond  prices 
might  have  behaved  if they  had been  quoted.  To circumvent  this diffi- 
culty, our first approach  is to assume  that expected  real returns on in- 
dexed  bonds  of all maturities  equal the expected  real returns on  short- 
term nominal  Treasury bills plus  a constant.13 That is,  we  assume  that 
the  rational-expectations  hypothesis  of  the  term  structure would  hold 
for indexed  bonds,  and  that  the  inflation  risk premium  in  short-term 
nominal  bills is constant. 
Note  that we  do not need  to assume  that the expectations  hypothesis 
13. With all of our results reported  here, returns  are measured  as the natural  log of one 
plus the conventionally  defined return.  This log transformation  of returns  is common 
in the empirical  finance literature.  It has little effect on our results, since our returns 
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describes  nominal  bonds.  Our  earlier  work  has  presented  evidence 
against  the  expectations  hypothesis  in  the  nominal  term  structure 
(Shiller, Campbell,  and Schoenholtz,  1983; Campbell and Shiller, 1991), 
although  we  have  also  found  that  nominal  bond  yields  move  closely 
with  those  predicted  by  the  expectations  hypothesis  (Shiller,  1972; 
Modigliani and Shiller, 1973; Campbell and Shiller, 1991). Barr  and Camp- 
bell (1995) find little evidence  against the expectations  hypothesis  in the 
term structure  of U.K.  indexed-bond  yields.  The assumption  of a con- 
stant inflation  risk premium  is harder to assess; we are disregarding  the 
possibility  that the  inflation  risk premium  might  vary systematically  in 
response  to the  quantity  of indexed  bonds  sold by the government,  or 
that the inflation risk premium might change through time as the market 
for indexed  bonds  became  deeper  and more liquid,  or that the inflation 
risk premium  might  change  through  time  as  the  public  became  more 
familiar with  indexed  bonds,  or just that the amount  of inflation uncer- 
tainty might  change  through  time. 
Given  these  assumptions,  we  can use  an econometric  model  to esti- 
mate what  the movements  of the indexed  yield curve would  have been 
in historical U.S.  data. Specifically, we proceed  as follows: 
1.  We take data on 3-month  U.S.  Treasury bill rates and  CPI inflation, 
and construct  the ex post quarterly log real bill return. 
2.  We regress  this return onto  a set of forecasting  variables.  The fitted 
value  of  this  regression  is  an estimate  of the  ex ante  quarterly real 
interest rate. Our basic set of forecasting variables includes  the lagged 
real bill return,  the nominal  bill yield  at the start of the quarter, and 
the lagged  inflation rate over the previous  year; we have also consid- 
ered an augmented  set of variables that includes  the 5-year nominal 
bond  yield  at the start of the quarter. 
3.  We  include  all  these  variables  in  a  VAR  system  to  calculate 
multiperiod  forecasts  of  the  ex ante  quarterly real interest  rate. We 
vary the lag length  of the VAR system  to make sure that our results 
are robust  to  the  choice  of  lag  length;  we  consider  1-lag and  4-lag 
versions  of the system. 
4.  We assume  that  the  expectations  hypothesis  of  the  term  structure 
describes  log indexed  bond yields,  and calculate yields  on hypotheti- 
cal zero-coupon  indexed  bonds from the regression forecasts of the ex 
ante  quarterly  real interest  rate.  The  fitted  yield  on  a hypothetical 
indexed  3-month  bill is just  the  1-quarter forecast  from the  model, 
whereas  the  fitted  yield  on  a  hypothetical  indexed  10-year  zero- 
coupon  bond  is a simple  average  of these  forecasts over the next 40 
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tween  nominal  bills  and  indexed  bonds,  arising  from inflation  risk 
premia  or risk premia  in the  real term structure of interest  rates.  If 
these  risk premia  are constant  but not zero,  our procedure  will cor- 
rectly fit the movements  of the indexed  yield  curve but will not cor- 
rectly measure  the average level  of the indexed  yield  curve.  Accord- 
ingly  we  use  our fitted  yields  to describe  second  moments  but  not 
first moments  of hypothetical  indexed  bond returns.) 
5.  We use  our fitted indexed  bond  yields  to calculate indexed  log bond 
returns at short and long horizons  and compare them with the returns 
on nominal  and hypothetical  indexed  Treasury bills rolled over to the 
same horizons.  If yk is the yield on a k-year indexed bond, for example, 
the  1-quarter  return  on  the  bond  is  just  (4k)ykt -  (4k-l)yk_l,t  +.  We 
compare  this  with  the  1-quarter real return  on  a nominal  3-month 
Treasury bill and on a hypothetical  indexed  3-month bill. At a horizon 
of k  years, we compare Ykt  with the k-year return on rolled-over nominal 
3-month  Treasury bills  and  on  rolled-over  hypothetical  indexed  3- 
month  bills. 
We illustrate  the results  of this exercise in Figures 1 and 2, which  are 
derived  from  the  basic  1-lag VAR system.  Figure  1 shows  the  ex post 
Figure  1 EX  ANTE  AND EX  POST  REAL  U.S. 3-MONTH  TREASURY-BILL  RATE 
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quarterly real return on nominal  3-month  Treasury bills (the solid line), 
along with  the VAR forecast of this return, which  is our fitted yield on a 
hypothetical  3-month  indexed  bill (the dashed  line).  Figure 2 shows  the 
real yields  on hypothetical  indexed  bonds  of maturities 1 year (the solid 
line),  2 years  (the  long-dashed  line),  5 years  (the  dotted  line),  and  10 
years (the short-dashed  line). These figures are intended  to illustrate the 
movements  of hypothetical  indexed-bond  yields,  rather than their aver- 
age levels,  which  are not identified  if risk premia are nonzero. 
Figure 1 shows  the familiar history of quarterly U.S. real interest rates 
over the past 40 years.  After a period of low real interest rates in the late 
1950s, real rates were comparatively  stable between  1% and 2% until the 
mid-1970s,  when  they  were  negative  or close  to zero for several years. 
Around  1980 there  was  a dramatic increase  in  the  real interest  rate to 
almost  6%, followed  by a gradual decline  (briefly interrupted in the late 
1980s) to levels  close  to zero in the early 1990s. Figure 2 shows  a similar 
but  considerably  dampened  pattern  in  the  movements  of longer-term 
indexed-bond  yields.  The  10-year  indexed-bond  yield,  for  example, 
hardly  declines  at all in  the  1970s and  rises  by less  than  2 percentage 
points  in 1980-1981.  This behavior is what one would  expect if much of 
the variation in the short-term real interest rate is transitory. 
Figure  2 EX  ANTE  YIELD  ON k-YEAR  U.S. INDEXED  BONDS 
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Table 3 reports summary  statistics comparing  the behavior of nominal 
3-month  Treasury bills with hypothetical  indexed  3-month Treasury bills 
and hypothetical  indexed  bonds  of maturities 1, 2, 5, and 10 years.  The 
basic  VAR system  is  estimated  with  1 or 4  lags  over  the  full  sample 
period  1953-1994,  and  with  1 lag over  the  subsamples  1953-1973  and 
Table  3  VOLATILITY  OF PRE-TAX  RETURNS  AND YIELDS  ON 
HYPOTHETICAL  INDEXED  BONDS  IN THE  UNITED  STATES, 
1953-1994 
Bond 
BA  s  ,  onda  1-quarter  moments  k-year  moments 
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Notes: Yields and returns are measured  in annualized  percentage  points.  Bond maturity is measured  in 
years.  Data  frequency  is quarterly.  The variables  in the  VAR include  the lagged  real bill return,  the 
nominal bill yield,  and the lagged  inflation rate over the previous year. Column (1) reports the standard 
deviation  of the yield on a hypothetical  indexed  3-month bill. Column (2) reports the standard deviation 
of  the  difference  between  the  real quarterly  return  on  a  nominal  3-month  bill  and  the  yield  on  a 
hypothetical  indexed  3-month  bill. Column  (3) reports the standard deviation  of the difference between 
the real quarterly return on a hypothetical  k-year indexed  bond and the yield on a hypothetical  indexed 
3-month  bill.  Column  (4) reports  the standard  deviation  of the yield  on a hypothetical  indexed  k-year 
bond.  Column  (5) reports  the  standard  deviation  of the difference  between  the real k-year return on 
rolling  over  nominal  3-month  bills and  the yield  on  a hypothetical  indexed  k-year bond.  Column  (6) 
reports the standard deviation  of the difference between  the real k-year return on rolling over hypotheti- 
cal indexed  3-month  bills and the yield on a hypothetical  indexed  k-year bond. 170 *  CAMPBELL  & SHILLER 
1974-1994.  For each specification  of the system,  the table reports a set of 
standard  deviations.  The table does  not  show  any means,  because  our 
methodology  for estimating  hypothetical  indexed-bond  yields  identifies 
only the variation of these  yields  and not their average level. 
The first three  columns  in Table 3 study  the behavior  of returns at a 
3-month  horizon.  The  first  column  gives  the  unconditional  standard 
deviation  of the yield  on a hypothetical  indexed  3-month bill. Under the 
assumptions  we  have  made,  this yield  is the rational expectation  of the 
real return  on  a nominal  3-month  bill,  and  on  a hypothetical  indexed 
long-term  bond  held  for 1 quarter. The second  column  gives  the  stan- 
dard deviation  of the unexpected  real return on a nominal  3-month  bill 
(the  difference  between  the  real return on  the  bill and  the  yield  on  a 
hypothetical  indexed  bill),  while  the  third  column  gives  the  standard 
deviation  of the unexpected  real return on a hypothetical  indexed  long- 
term bond  (the difference between  the real bond return and the yield on 
a hypothetical  indexed  bill). All yields  and returns are reported  in per- 
centage  points,  on  an  annualized  basis,  to  match  the  convention  for 
reporting  nominal  yields  on Treasury bills, notes,  and bonds.  Since we 
are using  log yields  and returns,  the numbers in annualized  percentage 
points  are just 400 times the numbers  in natural units. 
The table  shows  that there is some  inflation  risk in holding  nominal 
3-month  bills.  Column  (2) of the table shows  that over  the full sample 
period the standard deviation  of the unexpected  quarterly real return on 
these  bills  is  about  2 percentage  points  on  an annualized  basis,  or 50 
basis  points  per quarter. This inflation  risk could be entirely  avoided  if 
indexed  Treasury bills  were  available,  as  indexed  bills  would  have  a 
known  real quarterly return at the  start of each quarter. [The standard 
deviation  in column  (1) of Table 3, which  is also  close  to 2 percentage 
points  annualized,  represents  unconditional  variation  in this  expected 
return, not risk as measured  at the start of each quarter.] 
Hypothetical  indexed  long-term  bonds  also  appear  risky on  a quar- 
terly basis,  because  their returns  are affected  by quarterly news  about 
future real interest  rates. Column  (3) shows  that the standard deviation 
of the unexpected  annualized  quarterly real return on a 1-year indexed 
bond  is  1.7  percentage  points  in  the  1-lag VAR model  (1.0 percentage 
point  in  the  4-lag  model),  and  this  rises  to  6.6  percentage  points  (7.4 
percentage  points)  for a 10-year indexed  bond. 
There is of course no uncertainty  about the real return on a long-term 
indexed  bond if it is held to maturity, for its real return will then equal its 
yield.  Column  (4) of Table 3 shows  the unconditional  standard deviation 
of this yield  for 1-, 2-, 5-, and 10-year hypothetical  indexed  bonds.  Like 
the numbers in column (1), these numbers represent unconditional  varia- A Scorecard  for  Indexed  Government  Debt  *  171 
tion rather than risk from the perspective  of an investor.  As one would 
expect,  the  variability  of  indexed-bond  yields  declines  with  maturity, 
from  1.2  percentage  points  for a  1-year bond  in  the  1-lag model  (1.4 
percentage  points  in the 4-lag model)  to 0.4 percentage  points  (0.9 per- 
centage  points)  for a 10-year bond. 
Columns  (5) and (6) of Table 3 report the standard deviations  of unex- 
pected annualized  percentage  returns on nominal 3-month Treasury bills 
and  hypothetical  indexed  3-month  Treasury bills,  respectively,  rolled 
over  for  1,  2,  5,  or  10 years.  Hypothetical  indexed  bills  have  return 
uncertainty  of 60 to 100 basis points  per year, depending  on the invest- 
ment horizon and VAR lag length,  while nominal bills have return uncer- 
tainty  of  120 basis  points  per  year  or more.  Investors  and  borrowers 
could  avoid  this uncertainty  if long-term  indexed  bonds  were available. 
Panels (b) and (c) of Table 3 show  that there has been  some  change  in 
the  behavior  of  real and  nominal  interest  rates over  time.  In the  first 
subsample,  from  the  early  1950s through  the  early 1970s, real interest 
rates were  comparatively  stable. Hence  the yields  and returns on hypo- 
thetical indexed  bills and bonds  have much smaller standard deviations 
in columns  (1),  (3), (4), and  (6) of panel  (b). There was  also  somewhat 
less  inflation  uncertainty,  as shown  in columns  (2) and (5). The second 
subsample,  covering  the last 20 years,  has higher  inflation  uncertainty 
and  dramatically  higher  variation  of  hypothetical  bond  yields  at  all 
maturities. 
3.2.  INDEXED-BOND  YIELDS  IN THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
The validity of the numbers reported in Table 3 depends  critically on the 
assumptions  we  have  made.  In particular, the  risk premia  of 3-month 
nominal Treasury bills over 3-month  indexed  Treasury bills, and of long- 
term indexed  bonds  over 3-month  indexed  Treasury bills, must be con- 
stant. As a check on the reasonableness  of these  assumptions,  we apply 
the same methodology  to U.K. data. Since indexed  bonds  are traded in 
the  United  Kingdom,  we  can compare  our hypothetical  U.K.  indexed- 
bond yields  with  actual U.K. indexed-bond  yields. 
Table 4 has  exactly  the same  structure and sample  period  as Table 3, 
but is based  on U.K. rather than U.S.  data. We use the discount  rate on 
91-day government  bills as our 3-month interest rate (although  this mar- 
ket is considerably  less liquid than the Treasury-bill market in the United 
States),  and we  measure  U.K. inflation using  the retail price index.  The 
table shows  that both inflation uncertainty and the variability of the real 
interest  rate have been  much higher in the United Kingdom  than in the 
United  States. 
Table 5 compares  the hypothetical  indexed-bond  yields constructed  in 172 *  CAMPBELL  & SHILLER 
Table  4  VOLATILITY  OF PRE-TAX  RETURNS  AND YIELDS  ON 
HYPOTHETICAL  INDEXED  BONDS  IN THE  UNITED  KINGDOM, 
1953-1994 
Bond 
sBond,  1-quarter  moments  k-year  moments 
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Notes:  Yields  and returns  are measured  in annualized  percentage  points. Bond  maturity  is measured  in 
years. Data frequency  is quarterly.  The variables  in the VAR  include the lagged real bill return, the 
nominal  bill  yield, and the lagged  inflation  rate  over  the previous  year. Column  (1)  reports  the standard 
deviation  of the yield on a hypothetical  indexed  3-month  bill. Column  (2)  reports  the standard  deviation 
of the difference  between the real quarterly  return on a nominal 3-month bill and the yield on a 
hypothetical  indexed  3-month  bill. Column  (3)  reports  the standard  deviation  of the difference  between 
the real  quarterly  return  on a hypothetical  k-year  indexed  bond and the yield on a hypothetical  indexed 
3-month  bill. Column  (4) reports  the standard  deviation  of the yield on a hypothetical  indexed  k-year 
bond. Column (5) reports the standard  deviation  of the difference  between the real k-year  return  on 
rolling over nominal 3-month bills and the yield on a hypothetical  indexed k-year  bond. Column  (6) 
reports  the standard  deviation  of the difference  between  the real  k-year  return  on rolling  over  hypotheti- 
cal indexed 3-month  bills and the yield on a hypothetical  indexed  k-year  bond. 
Table 4 with indexed-bond  yields constructed from quoted prices of U.K. 
index-linked  gilts over the period  1985-1994. 
The analysis  of U.K. data is complicated  by the fact that U.K. indexed 
bonds  are not  perfectly  indexed,  but have  an 8-month  indexation  lag. 
This  means  that  inflation  in  the  last  8  months  before  each  payment A Scorecard  for Indexed  Government  Debt * 173 
Table 5  COMPARISON OF HYPOTHETICAL AND  ACTUAL PRE-TAX 
RETURNS AND  YIELDS ON U.K. INDEXED BONDS,  1985:1-1994:10 
Yields  Returns 
Bond 
VAR sample,  maturity  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
lag length  k (years)  ratio  ratio  Corr.  ratio  ratio  Corr. 
(a) 1953-1994 
1 lag  1  1.548  0.590  0.625  1.550  0.690  0.371 
2  1.235  0.679  0.456  0.870  0.845  0.186 
5  0.757  0.678  0.059  0.352  1.191  -0.054 
10  0.543  0.631  -0.276  0.255  1.211  -0.241 
4 lags  1  1.826  0.897  0.367  1.857  0.735  -0.104 
2  1.527  1.314  0.382  1.128  0.908  -0.239 
5  0.969  1.891  0.486  0.581  1.498  -0.064 
10  0.664  1.580  0.522  0.576  1.621  0.041 
(b) 1974-1994 
1 lag  1  1.810  0.603  0.497  1.865  0.809  0.095 
2  1.581  0.689  0.181  1.207  0.988  -0.076 
5  1.181  1.087  -0.265  0.603  1.581  -0.322 
10  0.984  1.110  -0.367  0.483  1.882  -0.371 
Notes:  This table  compares  the yields and returns  on hypothetical  indexed U.K. government  bonds, as 
calculated  in Table  4, with the yields and returns  calculated  from  actual  index-linked  gilts by Barr  and 
Campbell  (1995).  The columns headed "Mean  ratio"  report  the ratio  of the mean hypothetical  indexed 
yield or return  to the mean actual  indexed yield or return.  The columns  headed "S.D.  ratio"  report  the 
ratio  of the standard  deviation  of the hypothetical  indexed  yield or return  to the standard  deviation  of 
the actual indexed yield or return. The columns headed "Corr."  report  the correlation  between the 
hypothetical  indexed yield or return  and the actual  yield or return. 
erodes  the real value  of the payment,  so that U.K. indexed-bond  yields 
contain  a nominal  component.  Barr and Campbell (1995) correct for this 
and  calculate  implied  yields  on  zero-coupon  nominal  and  perfectly  in- 
dexed  bonds  in  the  U.K.  over  the  period  1985-1994.  We use  their im- 
plied indexed  yields  for the comparison  in Table 5. 
For each VAR specification,  sample period,  and bond maturity, Table 5 
first compares  the  moments  of  hypothetical  and  actual  indexed-bond 
yields.  The table reports the ratio of the mean  hypothetical  yield  to the 
mean actual yield,  the ratio of the standard deviation of the hypothetical 
yield to the standard deviation  of the actual yield,  and the correlation be- 
tween  the hypothetical  and actual yields.  Then the table reports the same 
moments  for quarterly returns on hypothetical  and actual indexed bonds. 
The mean  ratios tend  to be greater than one  at short maturities,  and 
less than one at long maturities, indicating that our hypothetical  indexed 174 *  CAMPBELL  & SHILLER 
yield  curve is flatter on average  than the actual yield  curve.  This result 
should  not be surprising,  since our procedure for constructing hypotheti- 
cal yields  sets all term premia to zero; if there are constant positive  term 
premia on longer-term  bonds,  our hypothetical  yield  curve will tend  to 
be too flat. 
For our  purposes  it  is  more  important  to  capture  the  dynamics  of 
indexed-bond  yields.  At horizons  of 1 or 2 years our VAR model seems  to 
do quite well; in the 1-lag VAR model estimated  over the full sample,  the 
standard-deviation  ratio is 0.59 for 1-year bond yields and 0.68 for 2-year 
bond  yields,  while  the correlation is 0.63 for 1-year bond yields and 0.46 
for 2-year bond yields.  These numbers indicate that the VAR  model under- 
states the variability of actual 1- and 2-year indexed-bond  yields.  Turning 
to indexed-bond  returns, the correlations are not as high, but the standard 
deviation  ratios are closer to one.  A visual impression  of these  results is 
given in Figures 3 and 4, which plot the actual and hypothetical  1-year and 
2-year indexed-bond  yields  over the 1985-1994 period. 
At  longer  horizons,  the  variability  of  both  hypothetical  and  actual 
indexed-bond  yields  declines; in the 1-lag VAR model estimated  over the 
full sample  these  declines  match each other,  so the standard-deviation 
ratio is roughly  constant.  The remaining  movements  of the actual long- 
term indexed  bond yield are poorly explained  by our VAR model. 
Figure 3 YIELD  ON HYPOTHETICAL  AND ACTUAL  U.K. INDEXED  BONDS 
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3.3 TAX  ISSUES 
3.3.1  The  After-Tax  Real  Interest  Rate  So far we have measured real inter- 
est rates on a pretax basis,  and have calculated the pretax indexed  bond 
yields that would  equate pretax returns on indexed bonds of all maturities 
to the pretax return on nominal 3-month Treasury bills. But these calcula- 
tions can also be done on an after-tax basis. The after-tax real interest rate 
is the nominal interest rate times one minus the tax rate, less the inflation 
rate,  since  nominal  interest  payments  are fully  taxable  in  the  United 
States.  Table 6 calculates  the  after-tax indexed-bond  yields  that would 
equate the after-tax returns on indexed bonds with the after-tax real inter- 
est rate. The table assumes  a constant tax rate of 0.3. We get results that are 
qualitatively  very similar to those  in Table 3. The tax correction reduces 
the average level of the real interest rate and of indexed  bond yields,  but 
has only minor effects on their movements  through time.14 
3.3.2  How Should  Indexed  Bonds  be Taxed?  It is also important to consider 
how indexed  bonds would  be taxed in the United States. This is a serious 
practical issue  that,  if not handled  correctly, may be an obstacle  to the 
14. Given these  results,  and the fact that Wilcox and Zervos (1994) find very low breakeven 
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Table 6  VOLATILITY  OF AFTER-TAX  RETURNS AND YIELDS ON 
HYPOTHETICAL INDEXED BONDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1953-1994a 
Bond 
A  s 
Bond 
1-quarter  moments  k-year  moments 
VAR sample,  maturity 
lag length  k years  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(a) 1953-1994 
1 lag  1  1.619  2.100  1.483  1.072  1.566  0.694 
2  1.619  2.100  3.421  1.007  1.587  0.890 
5  1.619  2.100  5.742  0.666  1.496  1.052 
10  1.619  2.100  6.532  0.395  1.390  1.046 
4 lags  1  1.852  1.920  0.897  1.292  1.401  0.603 
2  1.852  1.920  3.213  1.294  1.451  0.818 
5  1.852  1.920  5.178  0.942  1.431  0.995 
10  1.852  1.920  5.107  0.624  1.306  0.964 
(b) 1953-1973 
1 lag  1  0.745  1.485  0.397  0.529  0.905  0.229 
2  0.745  1.485  1.331  0.617  0.764  0.278 
5  0.745  1.485  3.896  0.406  0.523  0.321 
10  0.745  1.485  5.434  0.189  0.294  0.274 
(c) 1974-1994 
1  lag  1  2.181  2.451  1.837  1.455  1.677  0.839 
2  2.181  2.451  4.279  1.357  1.624  0.961 
5  2.181  2.451  6.901  0.843  1.517  1.070 
10  2.181  2.451  7.058  0.477  0.682  0.556 
a The  real  interest  rate  is  taken  to  be  0.7  times  the  nominal  interest  rate minus  the  inflation  rate, 
corresponding  to a tax rate of 0.3 on nominal interest. 
Notes: Yields and returns are measured  in annualized  percentage  points.  Bond maturity is measured  in 
years.  Data  frequency  is quarterly.  The variables in  the  VAR include  the  lagged  real bill return,  the 
nominal bill yield,  and the lagged  inflation rate over the previous year. Column (1) reports the standard 
deviation  of the yield on a hypothetical  indexed  3-month bill. Column (2) reports the standard deviation 
of  the  difference  between  the  real  quarterly  return  on  a  nominal  3-month  bill  and  the  yield  on  a 
hypothetical  indexed  3-month bill. Column  (3) reports the standard deviation  of the difference between 
the real quarterly return on a hypothetical  k-year indexed  bond and the yield on a hypothetical  indexed 
3-month  bill.  Column  (4) reports the standard  deviation  of the yield  on a hypothetical  indexed  k-year 
bond.  Column  (5) reports  the  standard  deviation  of the difference  between  the real k-year return on 
rolling  over  nominal  3-month  bills and  the yield  on  a hypothetical  indexed  k-year bond.  Column  (6) 
reports the standard deviation  of the difference between  the real k- year return on rolling over hypotheti- 
cal indexed  3-month  bills and the yield on a hypothetical  indexed  k-year bond. A Scorecard  for Indexed  Government  Debt  177 
effective  issuance  of government  debt  that promises  a stable real cash 
flow.15 In the United  Kingdom,  the capital gain component  of the return 
on  gilts  is  not  taxed,  and  so  the  nominal  capital gains  caused  by  the 
inflation adjustment  of principal for index-linked  gilts are not taxed. This 
gives  index-linked  gilts a tax advantage  relative to nominal gilts, more of 
whose  return comes  in the form of taxable coupon  payments.16 
United  States Treasury officials have  thought  that,  so long  as our tax 
system  is not indexed  to inflation,  the United States must not offer such 
a  subsidy,  and  should  tax each  year  the  inflation-induced  increase  in 
value  of the principal as income.  Note  that so long as the Treasury takes 
such  a position,  it is ruling  out  the  issuance  of bonds  whose  after-tax 
cash flow is immune  from disturbances  due to inflation.  Should there be 
a dramatic inflation,  then there would  be dramatic tax effects on the real 
wealth  of  investors  in  indexed  bonds.  If there  were  unexpected  very 
high  inflation  in the United  States,  then  under present  U.S.  tax law, all 
taxable investors  in indexed  bonds  would  see  a real one-year  after-tax 
return  on  their  investment  each  year  equal  to  minus  the  highest  tax 
bracket. A succession  of such years would  arbitrarily do great damage to 
the  net  worth  of investors.  If the  taxation on  the inflation-induced  in- 
crease in principal were deferred until a later date, as would  be possible 
for investors  with tax-deferred retirement accounts,  the tax effect on real 
values  would  not  be  so  dramatic,  but  might  still be  very  important  if 
inflation becomes  high.  This sensitivity  of after-tax returns to inflation is 
troubling because  it undercuts  the constancy  of real cash flow that is the 
chief attraction of indexed  debt. 
The ideal  solution  to this tax problem would  be to inflation-index  the 
entire  tax system,  and  not  tax the  inflation  component  of any returns. 
This  ideal  solution  does  not  appear  to  be  in  the  cards,  however.  An 
alternative  solution  would  be for the government  to create bonds  whose 
adjustment  of payouts  to inflation more than compensates  for inflation, 
so  that the  after-tax payouts  are stabilized  for certain tax brackets.  But 
the easiest  solution  would  be to follow the British example and make the 
inflation  component  of the  returns  tax-free.  There is nothing  unfair to 
other  taxpayers  implicit  in  this  solution;  the  market  would  price  the 
bonds  on the date of issue  higher because  of the tax subsidy.17 
15. Some former  obstacles  to issuance of indexed bonds in U.S. Federal  law and in the tax 
code have disappeared;  see McCulloch  (1980),  Hochman  and Palmon  (1988),  and Knoll 
(1991). 
16. This description  of the U.K. tax regime is accurate  through 1995,  but changes in 1996 
will alter  the tax treatment  of both nominal  and index-linked  gilts. 
17. There might be some revenue cost to the exemption  if the tax bracket  of the average 
bondholder  is higher than the tax bracket  of the marginal  bondholder  who determines 
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Making  the  payouts  on  the bonds  tax-free would  also  solve  another 
nuisance  problem with indexed  bonds  whose  entire payout is taxable. If 
the  inflation-induced  increase  in  principal  of bonds  were  taxable each 
year,  then  there  would  be  taxes  to be  paid  on  income  that is  not  yet 
received.  The  taxes  owed  could  even  exceed  the  coupon  income  from 
the  bonds,  putting  some  bondholders  in a situation  where  they  were 
unable  to pay  their taxes without  selling  some  of their indexed  bonds, 
incurring transactions  costs and facing difficulties  to do with  the lumpi- 
ness  of the bonds. 
4 How Would  the  Issue  of  Indexed  Debt  Affect  Treasury 
Borrowing  Costs? 
4.1 IS THERE  PUBLIC  DEMAND  FOR  INDEXED  DEBT? 
A direct objection to the issuance  of indexed  debt is that the public is not 
interested  in it except  in times  of hyperinflation;  only  economists  seem 
to want indexed  bonds.  There is a popular joke that if the U.S. Treasury 
is asked to issue  indexed  debt, then it should  mail prospectuses  to mem- 
bers of the American Economic Association.  If indexed  bonds  are such a 
good  idea  for  the  general  public,  why  haven't  they  taken  root  from 
private issuance  of such bonds  in the century and a half since they were 
first vigorously  advocated? 
The U.S. Treasury has been alert to possible  new markets as suggested 
by privately  created products.  For example,  in 1982, several investment 
bankers started marketing zero-coupon  securities derived from coupon- 
bearing  government  bonds;  these  were  called  TIGRs (treasury invest- 
ment growth  receipts) by Merrill Lynch and CATS (certificates of accrual 
on  treasury  securities)  by  Salomon  Brothers.  The success  of these  pri- 
vately created instruments  led the Treasury to issue its own zero-coupon 
bonds,  called Treasury strips. Thus, the Treasury followed  up quickly on 
a new  product  idea whose  value  had been  demonstrated  in the private 
market.  In contrast,  there  is  no  recent  U.S.  example  of  private-sector 
issuance  of indexed  debt for the Treasury to follow. 
Even the markets for indexed  debt in foreign countries are regarded by 
some  as  not  obvious  success  stories,  except  for those  issued  in  times 
when  inflation was out of control. Some argue that the index-linked  gilts 
issued  in the United Kingdom are not evidence  of the success  of indexed 
bonds,  because  the U.K. government  provides  a tax subsidy  in the form 
of zero taxation of the inflation-induced  increase in the nominal  princi- 
pal. This gives  index-linked  gilts a tax advantage  over conventional  gilts 
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especially  those  whose  maturity is relatively  short,  are held  by taxable 
investors.  Because  of  the  tax  subsidy,  the  government  is  able  to  sell 
index-linked  gilts  successfully  without  having  to offer a very low  price 
and high yield.  By this argument,  the tax subsidy is a less visible govern- 
ment subsidy  than high indexed-bond  taxable yields  would  be; the high 
yields  would  reveal  how  unsuccessful  these  bonds  really  are and  so 
might invite  criticism. 
The ability of the Treasury to issue indexed  debt is in some sense  open 
to question.  The issue  may "fail" if there is not enough  investor interest. 
For example,  an attempted  issuance  of indexed  bonds  in Italy in  1983 
was  widely  described  as having  failed; see Foresi, Penati, and Pennachi 
(1996).18  What can it mean when  people  say that a government  issue  of 
indexed  bonds  has failed? The usual stories of selection bias that explain 
why individuals  or firms may be unable to borrow at any interest rate, as 
for example  in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), do not seem  to apply when  the 
borrower  is  a national  government  and  the  lenders  are its  people.  A 
statement  that an issue  has failed apparently  should  be interpreted  as a 
discovery  that the real yield  that would  be necessary  to sell the issue  is 
very high,  so that the issue  can be sold only with a government  subsidy 
that is judged  as flagrantly high. 
We are not inclined  to use  the word  "success" or "failure" when  de- 
scribing  attempts  to  issue  new  instruments.  In any  event,  we  believe 
that the amount  of subsidy  implicit in real yields  and tax advantages  in 
the  U.K.  case  and  in  other  low-inflation  countries  has  not  been  "fla- 
grant." Still, there is a question  why  indexed  bonds  have not appeared 
privately  in  this  country.  There  appears  to be  no  clear understanding 
why  the public is not more interested  in buying  indexed  bonds. 
One  argument,  advanced  by  Irving Fisher (1928), is that people  are 
subject to "money  illusion"; they  are accustomed  to thinking  of money 
as a standard  of value,  and  do  not  trust indexation  schemes.  There is 
indeed  some  evidence  that people  are vulnerable  to some  illusions  and 
confusions  regarding  the price level; see  Shafir, Diamond,  and Tversky 
(1997) or  Shiller  (1996).  However,  these  public  errors in  thinking  are 
probably not immutable,  and if there were wider publicity given  to the 
advantages  of indexed  debt, then we would  expect many people  to learn 
that investing  in indexed  debt is wise.  We proceed with this paper under 
the assumption  that people  would  behave  rationally in connection  with 
these  markets if they were firmly established  as investment  vehicles  and 
viewed  as liquid investments. 
18. Contemporary  news  accounts  blamed the failure of the Italian indexed-bond  issue  on 
the choice of an obscure inflation index that was calculated only once a year, and on the 
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There is another interpretation of money  illusion,  that it occurs mostly 
in  low-inflation  environments,  and  there  because  most  people  do  not 
see  the  benefit  of  taking  the  trouble  to understand  and  deal  with  low 
inflation.  There is plenty  of evidence  that when  inflation becomes  sub- 
stantial people  do take the trouble, and money  illusion withers; note the 
prevalence  of indexation  in hyperinflation  countries.  Indeed,  even in the 
moderately  high  inflation  period  in the  United  States in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, there were  clear signs  that private indexation  schemes 
were  getting  established,  and one  might  well  suspect  that these  would 
have  succeeded  better had the inflation continued  or worsened. 
In 1979, the Timbers Corp.,  a New  York real estate development  com- 
pany, made inflation-indexed  mortgages available in Westchester County, 
New  York, and followed  this up later in Atlanta, Georgia. Shortly thereaf- 
ter, the Utah State Retirement System  began an inflation-indexed  mort- 
gage program. In 1982, the Real Dollar Corporation sought approval from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission  to sell indexed bonds to provide 
funds for indexed  mortgages.  At this time, the Fund for an Open Society, 
a nonprofit  Philadelphia  mortgage  company,  approved  a plan for an in- 
dexed  bond  and an indexed  mortgage  program. In 1982 the House  Sub- 
committee  on Housing  and Community  Development  held hearings  on 
plans for indexed  mortgages.  Proponents  of inflation-indexed  mortgages 
urged Congress  to pass legislation overriding state laws prohibiting nega- 
tive nominal amortization in mortgages,  which were an obstacle to wide- 
spread issuance  of inflation-indexed  mortgages.  Around  this time there 
were also some  unusual  schemes  related to indexed  bonds; for example, 
in  1980 the  Sunshine  Mining  Company  issued  $30 million  of bonds  in- 
dexed  to the price of silver. 
All of this interest  in indexed  bonds  dried up when  the inflation rate 
came  down  dramatically, following  the  Fed's new  restrictive monetary 
policy  and  the  great recession  of  1981-1982.  The powerful  impetus  to 
indexation  caused  by  seeing  dramatic  changes  in  real values  due  to 
inflation was gone.  The fundamental  wisdom  of indexed bonds remains, 
however,  as valid  as ever.  With long-term  bonds,  there is never  assur- 
ance  that a high-inflation  episode  like that of the  late  1970s and  early 
1980s will not return. It should  be possible  now  to remind people  of this 
possibility,  and  rekindle  the  interest  that was  once  shown  in these  in- 
dexed  bonds. 
4.1.1  Balkanization  An  important  argument  that  the  U.S.  Treasury 
raises against issuance  of indexed  government  debt is that it will balkan- 
ize the Treasury bond  market, and thereby increase the cost of borrow- 
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matter of conviction  to some  Treasury officials, and so we  should  take it 
seriously. 
It is conceivable  that the  market could  react in a negative  way  to all 
U.S.  debt if it perceived  that the Treasury would  reduce  the liquidity of 
its debt by creating  too many  categories  of debt.  By launching  a single 
new  indexed  bond  issue,  the Treasury could  engender  fears that there 
will  be  many  more  such  issues  in the  future,  thereby  creating fears of 
diminished  future liquidity. 
But we  find  it hard to understand  why  such  balkanization  costs  are 
expected  to be very large. The Treasury already has issued  many differ- 
ent kinds of debt in terms of maturity and coupon,  and the introduction 
of  Treasury  strips  was  a  major  innovation.  In  fact,  there  is  perhaps 
reason to think that the balkanization  costs are negative: so long as there 
is some  clientele  that is interested  in indexed  bonds,  the optimal thing to 
do,  from a borrowing-cost  perspective,  is to satisfy that clientele.19 Even 
if  money  illusion  is  widespread,  and  accounts  for widespread  public 
apathy  towards  indexed  bonds,  there would  still appear to be profits to 
be made in issuing  indexed  bonds  for those people  who  are not stymied 
by  money  illusion.  Surely,  there  must  be  many  people  (and  not  just 
members  of the American  Economic  Association)  who  are aware of the 
importance  of inflation uncertainty  in nominal  contracts.20 
4.2 HOW LARGE  IS THE  INFLATION  RISK  PREMIUM? 
Opposing  these  alleged  costs  to the  government's  issuance  of indexed 
debt,  there is the possible  advantage  of eliminating  the cost to the gov- 
ernment  of paying  the inflation  risk premium  on its debt. Although  we 
have  noted  above  that we  doubt  that the  size  of the inflation  risk pre- 
mium  should  be  a critical issue  in  deciding  whether  to issue  indexed 
bonds,  we will provide  here some  estimates  of its magnitude. 
There are two ways  to estimate  the size of the inflation risk premium, 
defined  as the average excess return on an inflation-sensitive  asset (say a 
nominal  5-year  zero-coupon  bond)  that  is  attributable  to  its  inflation 
sensitivity.  First,  we  can  assume  that  the  average  excess  return  on  a 
19. Boudoukh  and  Whitelaw  (1993) present  a formal model  in which  balkanization  is an 
optimal  strategy  for a bond  issuer.  They also point  out that the liquidity premium  for 
heavily  traded issues  in the U.S.  Treasury bond  market is only  about  10 basis points, 
although  it is as much as 70 basis points in the Japanese government  bond market. This 
liquidity premium  is small relative to plausible estimates  of the inflation risk premium. 
20. Treasury  officials  however  stress  the  great  cost  to  them,  in  legal  costs,  arriving  at 
decisions  about  the  kinds  of indexed  bonds  to issue,  and changing  of computer  and 
administrative  systems,  of issuing  indexed  bonds.  Possibly the greatest cost is the cost 
in time and attention  to high Treasury officials who  have many other pressing  issues  to 
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nominal  5-year bond  is entirely  accounted  for by its inflation  risk pre- 
mium,  and we can compare the average return or yield on the bond with 
the average  return or yield  on  a comparatively  riskless  asset  such  as a 
nominal  3-month  Treasury bill. 
Second,  we  can use  finance  theory  and  try to calculate the  risk pre- 
mium  that  would  be  justified  by  the  covariance  of  the  return  on  the 
nominal  5-year bond  with relevant state variables. In order to isolate the 
inflation-related  component  of this risk premium,  we  can compare  the 
theoretical  risk premium  for a nominal  5-year bond  with  the theoretical 
risk premium  for a hypothetical  indexed  5-year bond. 
4.2.1  Direct  Estimates from  Average Bond Returns  To  apply  the  first 
method,  we  use  Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data on 
nominal  zero-coupon  bond yields  over the period 1953-1994.  The yields 
are available  up  to a maturity  of 5 years; they  are calculated  from the 
prices of coupon-bearing  bonds  using a methodology  explained by Fama 
and Bliss (1987).21 
Table 7 reports  summary  statistics  on the yields  of nominal  bonds  of 
maturities  1, 2,  and 5 years.  Panel (a) covers  the whole  sample  period, 
1953-1994,  while  panels  (b) and (c) cover the two subsamples  1953-1973 
and 1974-1994.  For each bond  and sample  period,  the table reports the 
average excess  return over a nominal 3-month Treasury bill, the average 
change  in  the  yield,  and  the  average  yield  spread  over  a nominal  3- 
month Treasury bill. Standard deviations  of each variable are reported in 
parentheses.  The  units  for  the  table  are again  annualized  percentage 
points. 
The risk premium  on a nominal bond can be computed  either from its 
average  excess  return or from its average  yield  spread.  If one  assumes 
that changes  in  nominal  interest  rates have  an unconditional  mean  of 
zero,  then the unconditional  mean of the excess return should  equal the 
unconditional  mean yield  spread. 
Over  the  full  sample  period  1953-1994,  the two  averages  are indeed 
quite close  and suggest  a risk premium  of 70-100  basis points  on 5-year 
nominal  bonds.  In  finite  samples,  of  course,  these  two  averages  can 
differ.  The  finite-sample  average  excess  return  will  be  a  downward- 
biased  estimate  of the risk premium  in a sample where  there have been 
positive  surprises  in  nominal  interest  rates  on  average,  whereas  the 
finite-sample  yield  spread will be an upward-biased  estimate  of the risk 
premium  in  a  sample  where  there  have  been  positive  anticipated  in- 
21. In previous  work (Campbell,  1995; Campbell and Shiller, 1991), we have used  the zero- 
coupon-bond  yield  data of McCulloch  and  Kwon  (1993), which  end  in  1991. We use 
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Table 7  QUARTERLY SUMMARY STATISTICS  FOR U.S.  NOMINAL ZERO- 
COUPON  BONDS 
Maturity 
1 year  2 year  5 year 
(a) 1953-1994 
Excess return over  0.463  0.721  0.676 
3-month  bill  (4.340)  (7.746)  (14.668) 
Change  in yield  0.030  0.032  0.031 
(1.048)  (0.924)  (0.708) 
Yield spread over  0.440  0.634  0.981 
3-month  bill  (0.480)  (0.704)  (1.076) 
(b) 1953-1973 
Excess return over  0.171  0.116  -0.138 
3-month  bill  (2.647)  (4.744)  (9.518) 
Change  in yield  0.061  0.054  0.051 
(0.672)  (0.594)  (0.476) 
Yield spread over  0.366  0.431  0.686 
3-month  bill  (0.317)  (0.420)  (0.585) 
(c) 1974-1994 
Excess return over  0.755  1.326  1.490 
3-month  bill  (5.543)  (9.873)  (18.465) 
Change  in yield  -0.012  -0.002  0.003 
(1.325)  (1.168)  (0.885) 
Yield spread over  0.513  0.837  1.277 
3-month  bill  (0.594)  (0.859)  (1.345) 
Notes:  All units are annualized percentage  points. Quarterly  data on U.S. nominal-bond  yields and 
returns  are constructed  from  the Fama  files on the CRSP  tapes. In each pair  of numbers  the top number 
is the sample  mean;  the bottom  number  in parentheses  is the sample  standard  deviation. 
creases  in  nominal  interest  rates  on  average.  The  period  1953-1973  is an 
example  where  this  appears  to be important;  the  average  yield  spread  on 
nominal  5-year  zero-coupon  bonds  exceeds  the  average  return  on  these 
bonds  by  more  than  80 basis  points. 
The  instability  across  subsamples  in  Table  7 suggests  that  one  should 
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comes  out even more clearly when  one looks at the U.K. experience with 
indexed  bonds.  During  the period  1983-1994,  Barr and Campbell (1995) 
show  that the average  returns on U.K. nominal  bonds  were  almost 500 
basis points above the average returns on perfectly indexed bonds.  How- 
ever,  this  is not  a reliable guide  to the inflation  risk premium,  because 
the sample is a short one-the  500-basis-point excess return is not signifi- 
cantly  different  from zero  at the  5% level-and  an atypical one  domi- 
nated by unexpected  declines  in inflation.  When inflation unexpectedly 
declines,  nominal  bondholders  enjoy  windfall  gains  that are not  avail- 
able to indexed  bondholders,  but these  should  not be used  to estimate 
the inflation risk premium. 
Evidence  from longer  sample  periods  can also be informative.  Siegel 
(1994, Tables 1-1 and  1-2) reports  that long-term  nominal  government 
bonds  delivered  a geometric-average  real return of 3.4% over the period 
1802-1992,  as compared  with  2.9% for short-term nominal  government 
debt and 6.7% for a broad index of common  stocks. This implies a rather 
low  risk premium  on  nominal  bonds  of only  0.5%. This finding  is not 
driven by the inflation experience of the period since World War  II, for the 
average long-bond  premium over short debt is -0.3%  in the period 1802- 
1870, 0.5% in the period  1871-1925,  and  1.2% in the period  1926-1992. 
4.2.2  Indirect Estimates from Covariances  We  now  turn  to  our  second 
method  for estimating  the inflation  risk premium.  We use  asset  pricing 
theory to try to judge what risk premium is implied by the covariances of 
bond  returns  with  relevant  state variables.  We use  two  state variables: 
the  return  on  a  proxy  for  the  market  portfolio,  as  suggested  by  the 
traditional Capital-Asset  Pricing Model  (CAPM), and the growth rate of 
aggregate  consumption,  as  suggested  by  the  consumption  CAPM.22 
While  there  are of course  many  empirical deficiencies  in both  forms of 
the CAPM, most  of these  concern the cross-sectional  pattern of returns 
on stock portfolios  as documented  by Fama and French (1992) and oth- 
ers; even  if the CAPM fails in this respect, it may still explain the pattern 
of returns across broad classes  of assets. 
Some  tricky  empirical  issues  arise  in  implementing  the  traditional 
CAPM and the consumption  CAPM. In the traditional CAPM, it is con- 
ventional  to use a value-weighted  stock index as a proxy for the market. 
We follow  this convention  in the first row of Table 8, but in the second 
row  we  also  consider  a  broader  proxy  for  the  market  portfolio  con- 
structed  as 0.5 times  the value-weighted  stock index plus  0.5 times  the 
22. Campbell  (1996) has argued  that the return on a stock index  may be a good  empirical 
proxy  for  the  multiple  factors  suggested  by  the  Merton  (1973) intertemporal  asset 
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return on  a nominal  5-year zero-coupon  bond.  This weighting  scheme 
was  suggested  by calculations  of the ratio of corporate equity  to corpo- 
rate equity  plus  corporate bonds  plus government  bonds  in the Federal 
Reserve  Board of Governors  balance  sheets  for the U.S.  economy.  This 
ratio was close to 0.5 on average in our full sample and both subsamples. 
In the consumption  CAPM, problems  are caused by the fact that con- 
sumption  is measured  as a quarterly flow, so empirical researchers must 
decide whether  to identify  consumption  in a given quarter as beginning- 
of-quarter or end-of-quarter  consumption.  If consumption  is beginning- 
of-quarter,  then  asset  returns  measured  over  quarter  t  should  be  re- 
gressed  on consumption  growth  from quarter t to t +  1 (we call this the 
"lead" assumption);  if consumption  is end-of-quarter, then consumption 
growth  from  quarter t  -  1 to  t should  be  used  (we  call this  the  "lag" 
assumption). 
Table 8 reports  the betas  of nominal  zero-coupon  bond  returns with 
the  return  on  a value-weighted  stock index,  the broader proxy  for the 
market  portfolio,  "lagged"  consumption  growth,  and  "led" consump- 
tion  growth.  Correlation  coefficients  are also  reported  in parentheses. 
For comparison,  the beta and correlation coefficients  with  consumption 
are reported for the value-weighted  stock index. 
The table shows  that nominal bonds  tend to have rather small betas on 
the state variables that determine risk premia. The stock-market beta of a 
nominal  5-year  zero-coupon  bond  in  the  period  1953-94  is  only  0.1, 
implying  a risk premium  of 0.1 times  the equity  premium,  or about 60 
basis points.  The beta of the same bond  on the broader market proxy is 
0.4,  compared  with  a stock beta of  1.6; this implies  a risk premium  of 
0.4/1.6  =  0.25 times  the equity  premium  or about 150 basis points.  The 
"lag" consumption  beta of the bond is actually negative,  implying a nega- 
tive risk premium,  but this may merely indicate the inappropriateness  of 
this  timing  assumption.  The  "lead" consumption  beta  is  0.6,  as  com- 
pared with  a stock-market  "lead" consumption  beta of 4.0.  The implied 
risk premium  for the bond is 0.6/4.0  = 0.15 times the equity premium,  or 
about 90 basis points.  It is comforting that these  risk-premium estimates 
are fairly similar to each other and to the direct estimates  in Table 7. 
Interestingly,  all the betas for nominal  bonds  are considerably  higher 
in the last 20 years of the full sample  than in the first 20 years. This may 
help  to explain  the increase in yield  spreads  and average excess  returns 
on nominal  bonds  in the more recent period. 
For comparison,  Table 8  also  shows  betas  and  correlations  for  the 
hypothetical  indexed-bond  returns  that were  described  in Table 3. The 
indexed  bonds  always  have  negative  market  and  consumption  betas 
(although  the stock-market betas in particular are extremely small). This Table 8  QUARTERLY BETAS AND  CORRELATIONS OF EXCESS RETURNS WITH STATE 
VARIABLES 
Nominal bonds  Indexed  bonds 
1 year  2 year  5 year  1 year  2 year  5 year  Stocks 
(a) 1953-1994 
Value-weighted  stock  0.021  0.047  0.101  -0.022  -0.025  -0.020  1.000 
index return  (0.209)  (0.225)  (0.239)  (-0.208)  (-0.150)  (-0.088)  (1.000) 
50%-bond-50%-  stock  0.087  0.189  0.407  -0.044  -0.042  -0.020  1.593 
index return  (0.503)  (0.534)  (0.564)  (-0.249)  (-0.149)  (-0.052)  (0.937) 
Consumption  growth  -0.324  -0.665  -1.079  -0.272  -0.544  -0.863  2.775 
(lag)  (-0.190)  (-0.192)  (-0.153)  (-0.156)  (-0.199)  (-0.228)  (0.167) 
Consumption  growth  0.172  0.388  0.618  -0.347  -0.448  -0.476  4.040 
(lead)  (0.101)  (0.112)  (0.087)  (-0.199)  (-0.164)  (-0.126)  (0.242) 
(b) 1953-1973 
Value-weighted  stock  0.010  0.016  0.034  -0.027  -0.036  -0.040  1.000 
index return  (0.142)  (0.112)  (0.111)  (-0.281)  (-0.239)  (-0.194)  (1.000) 
50%-bond-50%-  stock  0.049  0.095  0.215  -0.055  -0.070  -0.072  1.785 
index  return  (0.375)  (0.365)  (0.383)  (-0.313)  (-0.250)  (-0.188)  (0.961) 
Consumption  growth  -0.227  -0.505  -0.855  -0.360  -0.637  -0.927  2.901 
(lag)  (-0.223)  (-0.245)  (-0.194)  (-0.261)  (-0.291)  (-0.309)  (0.198) Consumption  growth 
(lead) 
-0.069  -0.163 
(-0.070)  (-0.082) 
-0.544  -0.296  -0.476 
(-0.127)  (-0.222)  (-  0.224) 
-0.658  3.328 
(-0.227)  (0.235) 
(c) 1974-1994 
Value-weighted  stock 
index return 
50%-bond-50%-  stock 
index return 
Consumption  growth 
(lag) 
Consumption  growth 
(lead) 
0.030  0.070  0.152  -0.018 
(0.251)  (0.287)  (0.307)  (-0.166) 
0.108  0.239  0.512  -0.038 
(0.562)  (0.609)  (0.644)  (-0.215) 
-0.416  -0.791  -1.274  -0.195 
(-0.177)  (-0.166)  (-0.132)  (-0.090) 
0.594  1.349  2.541  -0.456 
(0.245)  (0.273)  (0.254)  (-0.203) 
-0.017  -0.006  1.000 
(-0.096)  (-0.026)  (1.000) 
-0.026 
(-0.095) 
0.008  1.488 
(0.020)  (0.926) 
-0.501  -0.906  2.669 
(-0.147)  (-0.192)  (0.137) 
-0.467  -0.288  5.192 
(-0.133)  (-0.059)  (0.257) 
Notes: Quarterly  nominal-  or hypothetical  indexed-bond  returns  and  the value-weighted  stock index  return from the CRSP tapes 
are regressed  onto  the value-weighted  stock index return, or the return on a portfolio with 50% weight  on the value-weighted  stock 
index  and 50% weight  on  the 5-year zero-coupon  nominal  government  bond,  or the backward  difference  of log nondurables  and 
services  consumption  (the "lag" row),  or the forward difference  of log nondurables  and services  consumption  (the "lead" row).  In 
each pair of numbers  the top number is the regression  or "beta" coefficient and the bottom number in parentheses  is the correlation 
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implies  that  indexed  bonds  would  have  small  negative  risk  premia 
rather than the positive  risk premia found  for nominal bonds. 
Longer-run  evidence  on  bond  risk  premia  has  been  reported  by 
Breeden,  Gibbons,  and Litzenberger (1989), who  study the period 1926- 
1982.  They  estimate  consumption  betas  indirectly  by  calculating  betas 
with  the "maximum correlation portfolio,"  the portfolio of assets  that is 
maximally  correlated with  consumption  growth.  The consumption  beta 
for bonds  is 0.05 times  the consumption  beta for stocks,  suggesting  an 
inflation  risk premium  of  only  20 or 30 basis  points.  Since  changes  in 
monetary  policy  have  tended  to increase  inflation  risk in the  postwar 
period,  it is not  surprising  that inflation  risk premia should  be smaller 
over the period  studied  by these  authors. 
Taken together,  the results in this section  suggest  that there is a mod- 
est positive  inflation  risk premium  in the returns on long-term  nominal 
debt.  A  best  guess  might  be  50 to  100 basis  points  for a 5-year zero- 
coupon  nominal  bond.  This implies  that there could  be nontrivial  sav- 
ings  to  the  Treasury from  reducing  its  issuance  of  long-term  nominal 
debt. 
Long-term  indexed  debt,  on the  other hand,  does  not seem  likely to 
have  a large  risk premium  and  might  even  have  a negative  risk pre- 
mium.  The main distinction  between  long-term indexed  and short-term 
nominal  debt  has  to  do  with  return volatility  at different  horizons,  as 
discussed  in the previous  section,  rather than with the average levels  of 
returns. 
5.  Indexed  Bonds  and  Monetary  Policy 
Indexed bonds  play an informational role by revealing the term structure 
of forward  inflation  rates.  If the inflation  risk premium  is fairly stable, 
this reveals  information  about the market's expectations  of future infla- 
tion.  This  can  help  the  monetary  authority  judge  the  credibility  of its 
anti-inflationary  policy. In this section  we  ask how  indexed-bond  yields 
might be used  to help forecast inflation. 
If we  had  both  nominal  and  indexed  bonds  for all maturities  out  to 
some  maximum  maturity, say thirty years, then there would  be, implicit 
in their yields,  market forecasts  of inflation for all forecast horizons  out 
to the maximum,  and also forecasts  of inflation for each year out to the 
maximum  maturity.  Professional  forecasters  do  not  routinely  produce 
forecasts in such detail and for such horizons.  When there is a market for 
both  indexed  and  nominal  debt,  then  there  is  a serious  incentive  for 
individuals  to try to forecast  inflation  in such  detail,  and  so we  would 
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extent that markets are efficient,  one would  expect that the bond-market 
inflation  forecasts  might  be much better than the professional  forecasts 
we  now  have. 
In assessing  this  argument  it should  be  remembered  that the  profit 
opportunity  available to traders in indexed  and nominal bonds  who  can 
better forecast inflation is not a risk-free one.  We are not talking about a 
riskless  profit  opportunity  if  the  inflation  expectations  implicit  in  the 
yields  are biased.  Thus,  there may be considerable  play in the relation 
between  optimal  forecasts  of inflation and market forecasts of inflation. 
There  is  another  concern  with  interpreting  inflationary  expectations 
implicit  in  nominal  and  indexed  bond  yields:  the  spread  can be influ- 
enced  by  both  current  and  expected  future  tax  laws.  The  Darby- 
Feldstein  hypothesis  (Darby, 1975; Feldstein,  1983) asserts that nominal- 
bond  yields  equal  a fixed  real rate plus  the  expected  inflation  rate di- 
vided by one minus  the marginal tax rate. The validity of this hypothesis 
is somewhat  clouded  by the complexities  of the tax system,  and more- 
over,  there  are multiple  tax brackets.  Even  if the  situation  were  clear 
with  regard to the current tax system,  long-term  bond  yields  would  be 
influenced  not  only  by  the  current  tax  system,  but  also  by  expected 
future tax systems.  For example,  it is conceivable  that taxation of nomi- 
nal bonds  might one day exclude the inflation component  of the interest; 
nominal  bond yields  ought  to vary through  time in response  to changes 
in the probability of such an exclusion. 
One  should  also  worry  that  the  inflation  risk premium  may  not  be 
constant  through  time,  and  thus  that the implicit inflationary  expecta- 
tions  derived  by  comparing  nominal  and  indexed  bond  yields  are in- 
valid.  The inflation  risk premium  might well vary through time system- 
atically, as public  attitudes  towards  indexed  and nominal  debt change, 
and as the public becomes  more accustomed  to indexed  debt. Moreover, 
the government  might be able to influence  this risk premium by chang- 
ing  the  amount  of  indexed  bonds  that  it  issues.  For example,  if  the 
government  were  to  issue  an  excessive  quantity  of  indexed  bonds,  it 
might not obtain a good  price for them,  and so the yield on indexed  debt 
would  rise, thereby depressing  the implied inflation risk premium.  What 
actually  happens  with  the  inflation  risk  premium  would  seem  to  be 
intimately  tied up with  the government's  policy.23 
To document  how  useful  indexed-bond  yields  might be in forecasting 
inflation,  in the idealized  world  of our econometric  model,  we  compare 
23. Sir Alan  Walters,  in  discussing  the  U.K.  experience  with  index-linked  gilts,  stressed 
that the government  should  be able to influence  inflation expectations  implicit in bond 
yields,  in  testimony  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Trade, Productivity,  and  Economic 
Growth  of the Joint Economic Committee,  May 14, 1985, p. 38. 190 ?  CAMPBELL  & SHILLER 
U.S. nominal  bond yields  with hypothetical  expected  inflation rates (the 
difference between  nominal bond yields  and hypothetical  indexed-bond 
yields)  as  forecasters  of  inflation.  We regress  the  annualized  inflation 
rate at horizons  of 1, 2, and 5 years on the corresponding  nominal-bond 
yield and hypothetical  expected  inflation rate. Table 9 reports the regres- 
sion coefficients  and R2  statistics from these  regressions  under the head- 
ing "Levels." Under the heading  "Differences," the table also reports the 
coefficients  and R2 statistics  from regressions  that subtract the inflation 
rate over the last year from both the regressor and the dependent  vari- 
able.  This  transformation  helps  to  ensure  that all the  variables  in  the 
regression  are stationary. 
We find  that  at every  horizon  and  sample  period,  the  hypothetical 
Table  9  INFLATION  FORECASTS  FROM  NOMINAL  AND HYPOTHETICAL 
INDEXED-BOND YIELDS 
Levels  Differences 
Forecasting  variable  1 year  2 year  5 year  1 year  2 year  5 year 
(a) 1953-1994 
Nominal  bond  yield  0.597  0.448  0.301  0.119  0.137  0.220 
(0.361)  (0.227)  (0.137)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.049) 
Expected  inflation  0.877  0.721  0.464  0.471  0.518  0.463 
rate  (0.592)  (0.415)  (0.228)  (0.084)  (0.100)  (0.144) 
(b)  1953-1973 
Nominal  bond yield  0.866  0.755  0.897  0.728  0.781  0.923 
(0.671)  (0.580)  (0.469)  (0.381)  (0.363)  (0.487) 
Expected  inflation  0.920  0.802  0.946  1.054  1.072  0.995 
rate  (0.670)  (0.544)  (0.355)  (0.348)  (0.325)  (0.380) 
(c) 1974-1994 
Nominal  bond yield  0.305  -0.026  -0.649  0.057  0.106  0.241 
(0.078)  (0.001)  (0.385)  (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.077) 
Expected  inflation  0.813  0.544  -0.555  0.320  0.416  0.445 
rate  (0.411)  (0.152)  (0.148)  (0.050)  (0.091)  (0.177) 
Notes: Annualized  inflation over the next k years is regressed  onto the k-year nominal-bond  yield,  or the 
difference  between  the k-year nominal-bond  yield  and the k-year hypothetical  indexed-bond  yield.  In 
each pair of numbers  the top number is the regression  coefficient and the bottom number in parenthe- 
ses  is the R2 statistic.  The columns  headed  "differences" subtract the 1-year lagged  inflation  rate from 
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expected  inflation  rate  is  a  better  forecaster  of  inflation  than  is  the 
nominal-bond  yield, in the sense that the regression coefficients are closer 
to their theoretical value of unity. Over the full sample period 1953-1994 
the R2 statistic is also about twice  as high  for the hypothetical  expected 
inflation  rate, although  the  results  are more erratic in the  subsamples. 
These  results  suggest  that the Federal Reserve should  not simply  use 
nominal-bond  yields  as  forecasters  of  inflation,  but  should  take other 
variables  (specifically,  the  variables  used  in  our  VAR system)  into  ac- 
count.  While  in  principle  the  Federal  Reserve  can  do  this 
econometrically,  as we have done  in this paper, there would  be practical 
and political advantages  to having  a market-based forecast based on the 
yields  of nominal  and  indexed  government  bonds.  Even if the market- 
based  forecast  were  subject  to  some  of  the  biases  we  have  discussed 
above,  it might  be that changes  in the market-based  forecast would  be 
recognized  by the  public as useful  information  about the changed  out- 
look for inflation. 
These  advantages  are well  illustrated by the experience  of the United 
Kingdom.  The Bank of England uses  the nominal and index-linked  U.K. 
government  yield  curves  to construct a term structure of forward infla- 
tion rates; since May 1993 the Bank has reported this term structure in its 
Quarterly Inflation Report, and it uses  it to judge  the medium-  and long- 
term prospects  for inflation.24 This procedure  gives  the Governor of the 
Bank  some  independent  evidence  of  inflation  prospects  to  use  in  his 
regular discussions  with  the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the ap- 
propriate stance of monetary  policy. 
6.  Conclusion 
We conclude  by considering,  in a more speculative  manner, some possi- 
ble subsidiary  benefits  of creating indexed  government  debt.  These  are 
benefits  that are caused  by private-sector  adoption  of indexed  contracts 
spurred  by the  demonstration  of indexing  by the federal  government. 
It is widely  acknowledged  that the proper role of the government  is to 
provide public goods,  and the demonstration  by example of the potential 
for new  financial markets and instruments  is really a public good.  The 
private sector tends  to undersupply  new  financial instruments,  particu- 
larly at the  retail level,  where  marketing  costs  are much  larger than in 
24. Breedon (1995) and Deacon and Derry (1995) explain the technical details of the Bank's 
approach.  King (1995) argues that the term structure of forward inflation rates provides 
a measure  of the credibility of official inflation targets. Barr and Campbell (1995) pres- 
ent  evidence  that  forward  inflation  rates  do  provide  better  inflation  forecasts  than 
nominal  bond yields  over the 1985-1994  period in the United Kingdom. 192 *  CAMPBELL  & SHILLER 
wholesale  financial markets. Any firm which took on the public relations 
effort needed  to first issue  private indexed  bonds  would  not be able to 
appropriate  much  of the societal benefits  to doing  so.  If indeed  there is 
today a slowness  to adopt indexing  methods,  because of a general feeling 
that these methods  have not been proven or have not met the test of time 
and  practice,  then  a demonstration  by  the  federal  government  of  the 
potential  for various  forms of indexing  may be highly  productive. 
If  the  U.S.  government  were  successful  in  creating  a  large,  liquid 
market for indexed  government  debt  today, then  it would  possibly  be- 
come,  given  the leadership  role this country has had in the past, a model 
for indexation  the  world  over.  The effect  could  be to help  educate  the 
public  about  the  importance  of indexing,  and  to stimulate  many  other 
forms of indexation. 
To illustrate  the importance  of this,  consider  the effects  of indexation 
of private  retirement  annuities  and long-term  residential  mortgages.  If 
private  retirement  annuities  were  indexed  to  inflation,  we  would  not 
have seen  the impoverishment  of many elderly, who chose a fixed nomi- 
nal payment  stream.  If long-term  mortgages  were  indexed  to inflation, 
we  would  not  have  seen  the  tremendous  redistribution  of wealth  to- 
wards  homeowners  that occurred in the United  States during the infla- 
tion of the last twenty  years. 
Nominal  mortgages  with  prepayment  options  protect borrowers from 
declines  in inflation  (since they can refinance their mortgages  if nominal 
interest rates fall); but they offer borrowers the potential for large gains if 
inflation rises.  The cost of this option is substantial,  perhaps as much as 
125 basis points in the mortgage interest rate.25  Indexed mortgages  could 
be issued  with prepayment  options,  but the comparative stability of real 
interest  rates would  make the prepayment  options  much  less  valuable, 
and this would  reduce  the interest rates on indexed  mortgages. 
Another  possible  effect  of  more  widespread  understanding  of  in- 
dexation  might be an increased  public willingness  to make all manner of 
longer-term  contracts.  There  are today  many  contracts  that  might  be 
made  more usefully  if there were a possibility  of making them  sensibly, 
in terms of real cash flows.  It is impossible  for us to predict the potential 
variety  of long-term  contracts that might  prove  to be economically  effi- 
25. At  1:30 P.M. on  February  1,  1996,  a newly  issued  7% GNMA  passthrough  security 
traded  at a price of  101-11. Under  Bloomberg  median  prepayment  assumptions,  the 
implied  yield  was  6.8% and the duration was just over 6 years.  At the same time a 6- 
year Treasury strip traded at a yield  of 5.4%. The spread of 140 basis points  is mostly 
attributable to the prepayment  option,  since government  agency bonds  trade at premi- 
ums  to  Treasury yields  of  only  20-25  basis  points.  Similar calculations  for a newly 
issued  7.5% GNMA passthrough  give a spread of 170 basis points. A Scorecard  for  Indexed  Government  Debt  * 193 
cient if there were a popular understanding  of the possibility  of couching 
their definition  in inflation-indexed  terms. 
If the benefits  of indexation  were  more widely  appreciated,  then  the 
chances  that our tax system  could be indexed  to inflation would  proba- 
bly be improved.  The benefits  of having a tax system indexed  to inflation 
are very significant; see for example  Feldstein  (1983). 
There is some  reason  to worry  that government  issuance  of indexed 
debt  would  not  have  much  of a demonstration  effect.  Certainly, there 
has not been  much private issuance  of indexed  debt in the United King- 
dom  or  in  other  moderate-inflation  countries  where  government  in- 
dexed  debt  has  been  introduced.  But one  should  not  assume  that this 
failure of the public to follow  the government's  example  that we  see in 
the United  Kingdom  is inevitable.  Bootle (1991) argued that a large part 
of the reason for the failure of many private firms in the United Kingdom 
to issue  indexed  debt is the U.K. tax law, which  has  "seemed  vague  or 
penal  or both."26 Possibly  a more important  reason  is just that opinion 
leaders  have not yet impressed  on the public the importance  of indexed 
private debt,  to overcome  their habitual impulse  to money  illusion.  His- 
tory suggests  that advances  in public enlightenment  are not easily gener- 
ated,  and may come  long after the initial stimulus  or only when  institu- 
tional  circumstances  are  changed.  If the  United  States  were  to  issue 
indexed  debt,  the public response  might well be different. 
There  might  also  be  some  negative  consequences  of  increased  in- 
dexation  of private-sector  contracts. One common  objection to the wide- 
spread  indexation  of the economy  is that indexation  diminishes  the in- 
centives  for the  government  to fight  inflation.  As  this  argument  goes, 
the people  who  are potentially  most hurt by inflation will protect them- 
selves  by indexation.  The political forces to prevent inflation will then be 
weakened,  and  the large number  of people  who  are hurt somewhat  by 
inflation,  and who  do not avail themselves  of protection via indexation, 
will  find  their interests  harmed.  A problem  with  this argument  is that 
the direction of the political effect of indexation  is ambiguous;  the politi- 
cal impact of indexation  may go the other way, along the lines argued by 
Margaret Thatcher.27 
A related  argument  is that indexation  of labor contracts may worsen 
problems  caused  by the reluctance of workers to take wage  cuts. If labor 
contracts  are specified  in nominal  terms,  then  inflation  can reduce  real 
wages  without  provoking  worker  resistance;  this  ceases  to be possible 
26. Bootle (1991, p.  122). See also Fischer (1983). 
27. Fischer and Summers  (1989) present  a simple model  to illustrate this ambiguity. 194 *  CAMPBELL  & SHILLER 
when  labor contracts  are indexed  to the price level  (Card and  Hyslop, 
1996). 
Although  we  appreciate  the  possibility  of negative  side  effects  from 
indexation,  we  believe  that the importance  of these  should  not be over- 
stated.  Although  the theory  of the second-best  tells us that the elimina- 
tion  of some  distortions  in the  economy  may worsen  other distortions 
and thereby  indirectly  reduce welfare,  we  find this to be unlikely  in the 
case of indexed  bonds,  where  the direct benefits  are so substantial. 
The U.S. Treasury officials who  apparently have the authority to issue 
indexed  bonds  may not see it as consistent  with their primary mission  to 
generate  public  goods  by  promoting  indexation  in the  economy.  They 
should  be urged to conceive  of their mission  more broadly, and to get on 
with  the creation of this important new  kind of debt instrument. 
Editors' note: Two months after the presentation  of this paper,  in May 1996, the 
U.S.  Treasury  announced  plans for the issuance  of indexed  government  debt. 
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Comment 
STANLEY FISCHER1 
International  Monetary  Fund 
This re-examination  of the case  for indexed  bonds  by two  outstanding 
finance-macroeconomists  is to be welcomed,  especially at a time when the 
U.S.  Treasury is once  again considering  issuing  such bonds.  Like most 
economists  who  have discussed  the subject, the authors are enthusiastic 
about indexed  bonds,  but the case they make is not overwhelming. 
The Treasury has previously  considered  issuing  indexed bonds at least 
three  times  in  the  last  twenty  years.2 The  difference  now  is  that  the 
proposal  comes  at a time of exceptionally  low inflation.  Nonetheless,  as 
the authors say, the political economy  question  of why the U.S. Treasury 
has  always  concluded  against  indexed  bonds  in  the  past  needs  to be 
considered;  the  apparently  successful  issue  of  indexed  bonds  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  issues  by  other  non-chronic-inflation  countries, 
including  Canada,  New  Zealand,  and Sweden,  reinforces this question. 
The other standard question  in this literature, of why  the private sector 
has not issued  index bonds,  also deserves  consideration.3 
A brief to the Treasury based on this paper would  say that the introduc- 
tion of indexed  bonds  would  have  three clear advantages:  first, on aver- 
age  the  real borrowing  rate would  be lower,  probably by 50-100  basis 
points  (although  it is  surprisingly  difficult  to tie  down  the  size  of the 
inflation  risk premium);  second,  policymakers  would  benefit  from the 
availability of a market-based measure of expected  inflation; and third- 
although  this does  not directly benefit policymakers-the  presence  of an 
indexed  government  obligation  would  encourage  the  spread  of  in- 
dexation  to  other  parts  of  the  financial  markets.  The brief would  also 
note  that the authors  believe  that three frequently  mentioned  objections 
to the issue  of indexed  bonds  are exaggerated: first, the fear that protect- 
ing  the  public  against  inflation  would  reduce  the political pressures  to 
fight inflation,  while  reasonable,  would  be outweighed  by the "sleeping 
1. On leave from MIT;  Research  Associate NBER.  The views expressed are those of the 
author  and not necessarily  of the International  Monetary  Fund. I have not adapted  these 
comments to reflect  the subsequent  Treasury  decision to issue indexed bonds. 
2. Bach  and Musgrave  (1941)  proposed  that  the Treasury  issue indexed  bonds to finance  the 
war;  we may therefore  assume that the Treasury  considered  the question  earlier  as well. 
3. Several  papers in Fischer  (1986)  discuss these issues. 
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policeman"  effect-policymakers  would  know  that  higher  inflation 
would  be penalized  by higher nominal debt payments;  second,  the mar- 
kets  would  not  balkanize,  meaning  that  the  introduction  of  indexed 
bonds  would  not  spoil  the  market  for nominal  bonds;  and  third,  the 
problem  of how  to tax indexed  bonds  can be overcome  by taxing only 
the nominal  component  of interest. 
I will comment  on five of these  points,  leaving aside the balkanization 
issue,  which  has been  settled  against balkanization  by the operation  of 
the  British indexed  bond  market.  On yield,  the authors  have  difficulty 
establishing  that the yield on indexed  bonds  will be below  that on nomi- 
nal bonds.  While it is natural to think that the answer can be found in the 
British data,  the authors  argue persuasively  that errors in expectations 
during the period in which  the British indexed  bond market has been in 
existence  make it very difficult to appraise that evidence. 
At least in partial equilibrium,  the answer to whether it will be cheaper 
to  issue  indexed  bonds  depends  on  whether  there  are already  other 
inflation  hedges  in the market.4 Although  it has often been  argued that 
rolling over Treasury bills provides  such a hedge,  Treasury bills are-as 
the  authors  emphasize-far  from being  a perfect  hedge.  There is  one 
way of hedging  against inflation, by taking a short position  or borrowing 
in nominal  debt.  Many  homeowners  and  others  have  such  a hedge  in 
their portfolios.  Most also have a significant long-term inflation hedge  in 
their claims on  social security  payments,  but these  too are of uncertain 
real value.  It thus appears that there is no asset yielding  a positive  rate of 
return  that is a reliable inflation  hedge.  This suggests  that individuals 
would  be  willing  to  pay-in  the  form  of  receiving  a  lower  rate  of 
return-for  being  able  to own  an asset  with  a safe real rate of return. 
In a general  equilibrium  context,  the  introduction  of indexed  bonds 
may  make  possible  intergenerational  risk  sharing  that  could  imply  a 
lower  equilibrium  rate of  return  than  that on  nominal  bonds.5  In this 
context,  it is also  easy  to see  the  case  for issuing  bonds  whose  rate of 
return is tied  to real GDP or real consumption,  assets  whose  introduc- 
tion Robert Shiller (1993) has supported  elsewhere. 
It is necessary  to consider two complications: first, the practical difficul- 
ties of indexing  short-term bonds;  and second,  the question  of whether 
there  is anything  special  about  a long-term  inflation  hedge.  Given  the 
mechanics  of collecting  and publishing  price data, the price information 
contained  in  the  most  recent  monthly  price  index  is  usually  three  to 
seven  weeks  out  of date.  Thus  it is mechanically  difficult to provide  a 
4. See "The  demand for index bonds"  in Fischer  (1986). 
5. See "Welfare  aspects of government  issue of indexed bonds"  in Fischer  (1986). Comment.  199 
very  short-term  inflation  hedge.  In the  British case,  indexed  gilts  are 
nominal bonds  for the last eight months  of their existence.  In the United 
States,  it would  not  be  possible  to  issue  a meaningful  one-month  in- 
dexed  bond. 
However,  the existing  lags are far longer  than they need  be. Modem 
technology  makes it possible  to create an essentially  instantaneous  price 
index,  which  could be available on line, as are asset prices and exchange 
rates. The lack of demand  for such an index in the industrial economies 
confirms  that  there  is  no  seriously  felt need  for a short-term  inflation 
hedge.6 In addition,  governments  may be reluctant to provide such indi- 
ces  for fear they  will  both  draw more  attention  to inflation  than  it de- 
serves,  and speed  up the wage-price  spiral. 
The  second  complication  arises  from the  distinction  between  short- 
and long-term hedging.  It is likely that most people interested in holding 
an indexed  bond  are thinking  of protecting  their standard  of living  in 
retirement,  many years off. It is difficult to specify a model in which  the 
distinction  between  short- and long-term hedging  should affect portfolio 
demand,  except by including  transaction costs,  or legal restrictions such 
as those  created by IRAs. It is true,  though,  that the inflation  hedging 
offered  by a given  asset,  particularly stocks,  could  differ depending  on 
the holding  period,  as a result of the serial correlation properties  of the 
asset  returns.  Such elements  have  not yet  successfully  been  taken into 
account in theoretical models  of the demand  for index bonds. 
The information  argument  for introducing  an indexed  bond  is valid, 
and much important work in this direction has been done by the Bank of 
England.  However,  tax considerations  always  complicate  the extraction 
of the expected  rate of inflation from bond  price data. Nor is it obvious 
that monetary  policy  suffers  much  from the  absence  of an asset-price- 
based measure  of inflation expectations. 
Until twenty  year ago, indexed  bonds had not been introduced in low- 
inflation  economies.  The question  of whether  the "sleeping  policeman" 
effect outweighs  the effects of the lower resistance to inflation produced 
by indexation,  the answer  to which  is theoretically  indeterminate,7  ap- 
pears to have been answered  in the affirmative by the most recent experi- 
ence.  It nonetheless  remains the case that many, especially  in Germany, 
strongly oppose  the introduction  of any indexation  for fear it will reduce 
public resistance  to inflation,  thereby leading  to higher inflation and, in 
equilibrium,  a worse  situation. 
6. Weekly  price data are generally  available in high-inflation  economies,  including  Brazil 
and,  more recently, Russia. 
7. Fischer  and  Summers  (1989)  show  that  the  result  depends  on  the  curvature  of  the 
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We come  next to what  I believe  to be the key reason the Treasury has 
opposed  the issue  of indexed  bonds,  their tax treatment.  In the present 
tax system,  the entire nominal  return on indexed bonds would  be taxed. 
This  means  that  the  real return  on  a bond  that  was  inflation  neutral 
before  taxes  would  be  negatively  associated  with  inflation-in  other 
words,  that  the  after-tax return on  an indexed  bond  would  not  be as- 
sured against inflation.  The Treasury could either let this feature remain, 
and  thereby  undo  most  of  the  purpose  of  the  index  bond,  or  make 
special provisions  for the taxation of indexed bonds.  For instance,  Camp- 
bell and Shiller suggest  that the nominal  component  of the return could 
be exempted  from taxation.  But whatever  is done,  once  the tax system 
takes account of inflation in taxing asset returns, the wedge  has entered. 
The  result  is  likely  to be  a piecemeal  spread  of  special  allowances  for 
inflation  and  eventually  the  complete  indexation  of the  taxation of re- 
turns on  assets.  Complexity  aside,  this would  not be a bad outcome- 
but it is easy to understand  why  the Treasury would  think long and hard 
before allowing  the wedge  to enter. 
Finally, we  come  to the last argument,  that by issuing  indexed  instru- 
ments,  the government  would  encourage  the development  of indexation 
in private markets.  This combines  with  the question  of why  indexation 
has  not  developed  in  private  contracts.  The  earliest  advocates  of  in- 
dexation  believed  that indexation  would  spread as soon as price indices 
became  widely  available.  One  answer  is  that indexation  is present  in 
many  long-term  contracts,  for instance  in power  industry  construction, 
and also in some  rental contracts.  But price-level indexation  is not pres- 
ent in shorter-term contracts. 
When  private  sector indexation  does  develop  in high-inflation  coun- 
tries,  it is  typically  to  the  exchange  rate.  This must  be  partly because 
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cause  price indices  are available  only  with  a lag and  infrequently,  and 
also because  relative price variability becomes  larger as the inflation rate 
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It is indeed  likely that government  issue  of a long-term indexed  bond 
would  help  in the development  of long-term  indexed  retirement annu- 
ities  and  other  inflation-protected  vehicles  for long-term  saving.  This 
would  be the most important benefit of such an initiative. 
I would  be  in  favor of government  issue  of  such  bonds,  with  some 
special provision  for dealing  with the tax complications.  One possibility 
is  to  allow  such  assets  to be  held  only  by  those  saving  in  tax-exempt 
form, for example  in individual  retirement accounts.  Of course,  taxation Comment*  201 
at withdrawal  would  in effect tax the inflation adjustment.  But pending  a 
complete  adjustment  of asset taxation for inflation,  that may be the best 
way  of moving  ahead with  government  issue  of indexed  bonds. 
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1.  Introduction 
In evaluating  any  proposal  for government  action  it is natural to con- 
sider,  first,  whether  there  is evidence  of a sizable  externality, and  sec- 
ond,  whether  the expected  costs of the government  intervention  exceed 
the expected  gains.  This provocative  paper informally undertakes  such 
an  analysis,  and  enthusiastically  concludes  that  the  U.S.  Treasury 
should  introduce  indexed  government  debt.  The purported  benefits  of 
indexed  debt  include  enhanced  opportunities  for risk sharing,  the cre- 
ation  of  useful  information  for  policymakers  about  inflation  expecta- 
tions,  and a potentially  reduced  incentive  for the government  to pursue 
an inflationary  policy. At the same time the associated  costs  are consid- 
ered  to  be  relatively  small.  The  authors  also  present  some  empirical 
evidence  on two factors that might affect one's assessment  of the merits 
of  such  a  policy-the  likely  statistical  behavior  of  indexed  bonds  as 
compared  to nominal  Treasury debt, and the inflation risk premium. 
The main focus  of this discussion  is to re-examine  some  of the poten- 
tial costs  and benefits  of indexed  government  debt.  I conclude  that the 
case for indexing  is weaker than the authors contend,  both because they 
understate  the likely costs and because  they overstate  the benefits.  Sev- 
eral empirical issues  that might help to resolve  this debate are discussed 
in Section 3. 
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2.  Reevaluating  the  Costs  and  Benefits  of Indexed  Debt 
2.1 THE  COSTS 
A key consideration  for Treasury officials is that the real interest cost of 
indexed  debt  may be  higher  than under  their status  quo  policy. These 
higher  costs  could  arise  from  reduced  liquidity,  low  market  demand, 
initial  difficulties  in  pricing,  potential  spillover  effects  on  the  price  of 
other Treasury securities,  and so forth. The traditional Treasury view has 
been  that the capital market is smart and flexible. Therefore it is thought 
that the  best  strategy  to keep  borrowing  costs  low  is to follow  a stable 
and predictable policy, leaving  financial innovation  to the private sector. 
The introduction  of Treasury strips is cited by the authors as an excep- 
tion to this rule, but in fact the government  only adopted  this innovation 
after it had  proven  to be very  profitable for private investment  banks. 
This example  contrasts with the private sector's experience with indexed 
debt,  which  has  been  largely  unsuccessful  in  the  United  States  and 
which  has only been  adopted  during periods of high inflation abroad. It 
should  also be noted  that, unlike  indexed  debt,  there is no uncertainty 
about how  to price Treasury strips,  since this can be done  using  simple 
no-arbitrage conditions. 
From a pure cash-flow  perspective,  even  a small increase in required 
debt  yields  would  have  a substantial  cost  to the  Treasury. This can be 
illustrated by a simple back-of-the-envelope  calculation: Imagine that 5% 
of the approximately  $4 trillion debt held by the public is indexed,  and 
that indexed  debt costs the government  20 basis points more than compa- 
rable nonindexed  debt.  The  annual  interest  cost  differential  would  be 
$400 million.  Notice  that an increase of this magnitude,  although  signifi- 
cant in  dollar terms,  would  be virtually undetectable  in statistical data 
because  of the background  variability in yields  due to other factors. 
The proposed  tax treatment,  under which  the inflation adjustment  on 
the principal portion of the debt would  not be taxed, represents  another 
potentially  large real cost  to the Treasury. The reason  for this tax treat- 
ment is that for the debt to be risk-free after tax, some adjustment  of this 
sort is necessary.  The authors  contend  that this policy would  not create 
any costs  for the Treasury because  the required return would  fall in an 
amount equal to the tax benefit.  This would  only be the case, however,  if 
there were a single  marginal tax rate for all investors.  As with municipal 
bonds,  the  government  is likely  to experience  a net  revenue  loss  as  a 
result of this tax treatment because  the marginal tax rate of some  inves- 
tors  in  the  indexed  bonds  would  be  higher  than  the  tax rate  of  the 
marginal investor. 
The above  line  of reasoning  is dismissed  by the  authors,  who  state, Comment 203 
"There are a number  of reasons  to think  that the  form of government 
finance  does  matter, but they involve  more subtle considerations  than a 
simple-minded  emphasis  on  average  government  borrowing  costs." 
This assertion is justified with the observation that the interest payments 
on the debt, on average,  are made to a representative  debt holder who is 
also the representative  taxpayer. Therefore in a Modigliani-Miller  world 
filled with  representative  agents,  the cost of the debt would  not matter. 
Of course there is no reason to discuss  indexation  in a frictionless world 
with  homogeneous  agents,  so this cannot be taken as a serious  rebuttal 
to these  concerns. 
As  a practical matter there are a number  of compelling  reasons  why 
government  borrowing  costs  matter. Currently the government  faces a 
binding  budget  constraint,  so that additional  expenditures  on indexing 
could preclude  spending  on programs with greater social benefits.  There 
is also the issue  of intragenerational  and intergenerational  wealth  redis- 
tribution.  To the  extent  that the  higher  interest  costs  would  be deficit- 
financed,  the  burden  is shifted  to future generations  who,  projections 
suggest,  already  face  greater  lifetime  tax burdens  relative  to  benefits 
than  do  current  generations.  Furthermore,  since  government  debt  is 
held  disproportionately  by the relatively wealthy,  offering a higher real 
return financed  with  taxes paid by a broad cross-section  of the popula- 
tion is regressive.  In sum,  the Treasury's concerns about the potentially 
large costs  of indexed  debt are legitimate.  Quantifying  these  costs more 
carefully  is  a necessary  first step  in  seriously  evaluating  the  merits  of 
indexation. 
2.2 THE  BENEFITS 
Among  the potential benefits  associated  with indexed  debt, the prospect 
of improving  opportunities  for risk sharing by increasing the private use 
of indexed  contracts is perhaps  the most compelling.  For instance,  retir- 
ees  seeking  risk-free annuities  could  benefit  because  insurance  compa- 
nies interested  in offering such products could hedge  by buying indexed 
government  bonds.  Some have suggested  that real annuities  of this sort 
are currently unavailable  primarily because  there is no obvious  way  for 
insurers to offset the inflation risk. 
One  must  of course  wonder  why  a private indexed  debt market has 
not developed  independently  if the potential  gains from improved  risk- 
sharing are large. There are a number of private corporate borrowers for 
whom  issuing  indexed  bonds  would  be a hedge  against uncertain future 
borrowing  costs.  This group can be thought  of as a natural issuing  clien- 
tele,  since these firms would  be willing to issue indexed  debt even in the 
absence  of  an  inflation  risk  premium.  Nevertheless,  few  private 204- LUCAS 
inflation-indexed  contracts were observed even in the high-inflation  peri- 
ods  of  the  1970s and  1980s.  This  suggests  that either  the  demand  for 
these  products  is weak,  or the costs involved  in marketing these  instru- 
ment  are prohibitive.  It seems  unlikely  that  the  associated  marketing 
costs  are the  main  consideration.  The  last  twenty  years  has  seen  the 
proliferation  of  highly  complicated  debt  products,  such  as  mortgage- 
backed  and  asset-backed  securities,  many  of which  are arguably more 
difficult to price and explain  to investors  than indexed  debt.  I therefore 
conclude  that demand  for indexed  debt is at best limited.  Why is this? 
One  interpretation  suggested  by the authors is that the public is naive. 
Another  possibility,  however,  is that most  exposure  to inflation  risk is 
already being  limited  by some  other mechanism.  For instance,  the con- 
sumption  of  most  retirees  may  be  largely  hedged  by  investments  in 
housing  and  stocks,  by  the  indexation  of social  security  and  Medicare 
benefits,  and  by  the  expectation  of transfers from their children  in the 
event  of a large shock  to their personal  resources.  A direct examination 
of household  portfolio allocations might help to clarify this issue. 
A  second  potential  benefit  of  indexing  the  government's  debt  is  to 
weaken  the incentive  to inflate away its real value. Further, it is suggested 
that indexed  debt could be a "sleeping policeman" that would discourage 
inflationary  policy,  since  the  government's  debt  expense  would  grow 
quickly  if  rapid  inflation  were  ever  permitted.  Neither  of  these  argu- 
ments,  however,  is  entirely  persuasive.  For indexed  debt  to  act as  a 
deterrent,  it would  have  to  replace  a significant  amount  of long-term 
debt.  The small amount  of indexed  debt recommended  for demonstra- 
tion purposes  would  be insufficient  in this regard. The sleeping  police- 
man seems  to be a case of money  illusion,  since any increase in financing 
costs  due  to indexing  would  be nominal  rather than real. Furthermore, 
these  incentives  could be altered without introducing  a new type of debt 
instrument.  For instance,  the government  could reduce the incentive  to 
inflate simply  by shortening  the maturity structure of the nominal debt, 
although  this might increase costs by necessitating  more frequent refund- 
ings.  An  argument  can be  made  that issuing  short-term  nominal  debt 
actually has better incentive  effects than indexed debt. This is because,  as 
a first approximation,  with indexed  debt inflation should  have no effect 
on real funding  costs,  but with nominal debt increases in expected  infla- 
tion that are not realized increase the real cost of the debt. 
3.  Empirical  Issues 
The  empirical  section  of the  paper  addresses  the  question  "Are short- 
term Treasury securities  a close substitute  for indexed  bonds  in terms of Comment 205 
the variance in realized real returns?" This question is relevant because if 
the  two  securities  were  close  substitutes,  the  welfare  gains  from  im- 
proved  risk sharing  with  indexed  debt  would  be  negligible.  The  con- 
verse,  however,  is not true. If the two types of securities are poor substi- 
tutes,  it is still possible  that other mechanisms  exist  to hedge  inflation 
risk,  so  the  outcome  of this  exercise  has  little bearing  on whether  it is 
worthwhile  for the Treasury to issue  indexed  bonds.  Nevertheless  this is 
an interesting  question  that is addressed  in a novel  way, made possible 
by the availability of data on indexed  debt in Britain. 
Comparing  the  variability  of real returns  for indexed  U.S.  debt  and 
Treasury  bills  requires  creating  an  imaginary  indexed  contract,  since 
actual contracts  are not available.  This is accomplished  using  a VAR to 
forecast  the  statistical  properties  of  the  hypothetical  debt.  The  British 
experience  is useful  because  it allows  comparison  of the performance of 
hypothetical  indexed  bonds  with  actual indexed  bonds.  Two aspects  of 
the  results  are  notable.  First,  the  volatility  of  real returns  for  British 
indexed  bonds  is much  higher  than for the hypothetical  British bonds. 
This suggests  that the  true volatility  of indexed  debt in the U.S.  might 
also exceed  the volatility  estimated  with  the hypothetical  model,  reduc- 
ing  the  estimated  benefits  of indexed  debt.  A statistical reason  for this 
bias is that since  the  VAR used  to generate  the  hypothetical  returns is 
unlikely  to take into  account  all the factors that affect real returns,  the 
estimated  volatility  will  generally  be lower  than the true volatility. The 
second  notable  result  is  that  for longer  maturities,  the  correlation be- 
tween  returns  on  the  hypothetical  and  actual indexed  British bonds  is 
low or even negative,  suggesting  that one must be cautious about conclu- 
sions  drawn  from  the  statistical  properties  of  the  hypothetical  bonds 
used to forecast the anticipated U.S. experience.  A final issue in interpret- 
ing these  results is how  to decide what is a "significant" difference in the 
volatility of returns. The analysis compares raw standard deviations,  but 
a utility-based  metric would  be more relevant to the question  of whether 
indexed  debt  is welfare-improving.  This would  again highlight  the im- 
portance of understanding  the correlation between  individual  consump- 
tion  and  inflation,  rather than  the  returns  on  a particular investment 
strategy. 
The paper alludes  to the fact that recently several countries have intro- 
duced  indexed  government  debt,  and  many  unanswered  questions 
about their experience  remain: What was-the impetus  for introduction  of 
indexed  debt in low-inflation  countries  such  as Canada,  New  Zealand, 
Sweden?  In Britain, where  these  bonds  have  been  available  for some 
time,  has  there been  an increase  in the number of private indexed  con- 
tracts since the introduction  of this debt? Who tends to hold these securi- 206 *  DISCUSSION 
ties? How  does  trading volume  compare with similar nonindexed  securi- 
ties in those  markets?' Answers  to these questions  would  help to resolve 
the  debate  about  the  magnitude  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  debt  in- 
dexation,  and  hopefully  future  research  will  address  these  important 
issues. 
Discussion 
Martin Feldstein  suggested  that the impression  that private-sector  con- 
tracts are not indexed  is correct only at the "retail" level.  For example,  a 
variety of indexing  arrangements exist for commercial mortgages,  includ- 
ing  indexation  to  rents  received,  to  current  sales  (as  for  a  shopping 
center), or to current interest rates, as well as to the CPI. These examples 
of private-sector  indexing  would  be a fruitful topic for study. 
Feldstein  also  asked  the  authors  why  they  felt  that  indexed  bonds 
would  be  worthwhile  only  if  the  inflation  premium  were  taxed  in  a 
different  way  than other components  of interest  payments.  David Wil- 
cox added  that,  while  indexing  the entire tax code  to inflation  was  the 
most  desirable outcome,  failing that radical change,  issuance  of indexed 
bonds  with  fully taxable interest  might  still be a step in the right direc- 
tion.  Stanley Fischer replied that, if the goal is to provide an instrument 
which  insulates  real returns from inflation,  then  taxing this instrument 
in such  a way  as to create a high  correlation of the realized  return and 
the inflation  rate rather defeats  the purpose.  Robert Shiller agreed with 
Fischer, arguing that providing  an inflation hedge  for small savers was a 
primary reason  for issuing  indexed  bonds.  Feldstein  noted  that, even  if 
the inflation  adjustment  in indexed  bonds  were taxed,  the typical small 
saver would  be able to avoid  much  of this tax by holding  these  instru- 
ments  in IRAs or 401(k) accounts. 
Wilcox  praised  the  paper  as  addressing  a very  important  topic  but 
wondered  whether  the  argument  that  indexed  bonds  would  provide 
information  about  expected  inflation  would  be  taken  seriously  by  the 
Treasury. One  concern  about the informational role of indexed  bonds  is 
that bond  traders are not the "public" whose  expectations  policymakers 
would  like  to  know;  moreover,  given  the  heterogeneity  of beliefs  and 
expectations,  it is not clear that the inflation expectations  of the marginal 
holder  of  indexed  bonds  would  be  an  unbiased  forecast  of  inflation. 
1. Britain's  $250  million in daily turnover  on $57  billion  of indexed debt implies a turnover 
rate of  ?%  daily. Compared to U.S. turnover,  which is on order of 8% per day, this 
suggests that the liquidity  of these securities  may be fairly  low. 
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Matthew  Shapiro added that the Campbell-Shiller  proposal for tax- shel- 
tering  the  inflation  premium  might  further  contaminate  the  informa- 
tional value  of indexed  bonds. 
Wilcox also discussed  the British experience  with indexed  bonds.  Al- 
though  most count these  bonds  as a success,  he said, there is a minority 
view  that they  are not  a success,  because  investors  who  held  indexed 
bonds  during  the  1980s did poorly  relative to those  who  held  nominal 
securities.  Shiller responded  that, of course,  indexed  bonds  will do rela- 
tively  poorly  when  inflation  is lower  than anticipated,  as was  the  case 
during  the  1980s in the U.K.; and that perhaps  we  should  take inspira- 
tion  from  the  fact  that  the  U.K.  market  has  accepted  indexed  bonds 
despite  this accident of history. Olivier Blanchard wondered  why it is the 
case that, still, 85% of the British government  debt outstanding  is nomi- 
nal.  Is it because  the public considers  15% indexed  debt to be enough, 
and this is reflected  in rates of return? Or because  for some  reason  the 
government  is reluctant to rely too heavily on indexed bonds? Blanchard 
also directed attention  to the fact that the estimated volatility of the yield 
on  the  hypothetical  indexed  bond  is  lower  than  that  of the  actual in- 
dexed  bond;  he  asked  whether  this difference  is statistically significant 
and if so, whether  a liquidity-premium  effect might account for it. 
Greg Mankiw addressed  the contention  that the provision  of financial 
innovations  is a public good.  If this were true, he pointed  out, then  the 
government  ought  to subsidize  Wall Street "rocket scientists" engaging 
in financial  innovation.  But many  people  would  argue that there is al- 
ready  too  much  talent  being  devoted  to  the  development  of  esoteric 
financial  instruments;  so  the  argument  should  be not  that there is too 
little financial innovation  but that it is of the wrong kind. John Campbell 
agreed  that it is not  the  lack of financial  innovation  per se  that is  the 
issue,  but the fact that the wedge  between  the private and social returns 
to  innovation  may  depend  on  the  prospective  clientele.  In particular, 
because  the returns to innovations  that benefit financial institutions  are 
easier to capture, and the fixed costs (such as marketing and distribution 
costs)  are lower,  innovations  that are desired  by institutions  and  other 
insiders  in  financial  markets  are more  likely  to be  privately  provided 
than are innovations  that benefit  the general public. For example,  most 
of the innovation  in mortgage  financing has taken place in areas like the 
development  of  mortgage-backed  securities,  not  in  changes  in  retail 
mortgage  instruments,  despite  the large potential  benefits  of the latter. 
Since  the issuance  of indexed  bonds  by the government  would  reduce 
the costs  to private-sector  financial institutions  of educating  the public, 
clarifying  the  tax treatment  of indexed  debt,  and  so  on,  it is for retail 
transactions  that the demonstration  effect might be the most beneficial. 208 *  DISCUSSION 
Fischer  said  that  the  innovations-as-public-good  argument  is  exagger- 
ated a little; he gave as an example the increased use of indexation by the 
public in the writing of wills. 
Mankiw  also invited  the authors to back up quantitatively  their argu- 
ment that indexed  bonds  are desirable because  they smooth  taxes across 
states  of  nature.  The  argument  in  the  paper  hinges  on  the  marginal 
deadweight  loss of taxes varying over different states of the world.  How- 
ever,  Mankiw  said,  there  may  not  be  enough  macroeconomic  uncer- 
tainty to make this variation important.  Julio Rotemberg asked whether 
eliminating  the  government's  option  to default  on its debt by inflating 
might  not be costly, as there are circumstances  in which  at least partial 
repudiation  of  the  debt-without  incurring  the  legal  and  reputational 
costs  of  outright  default-might  be  desirable.  James Stock  suggested 
that  the  authors  evaluate  the  robustness  of  their  results  to  different 
measures  of inflation,  since it is well known  that the CPI contains nega- 
tive moving-average  errors. 
Finally,  the  authors  responded  to  other  issues  raised  by  the  dis- 
cussants.  Shiller re-emphasized  the potential value of the demonstration 
effect of Treasury issuance  of indexed  bonds,  noting  that the public was 
historically  slow  to accept a number of financial innovations,  like home- 
owners'  insurance,  that  are now  widespread.  John Campbell  stressed 
the narrowness  of the view  that makes  the average interest costs  of the 
Treasury the paramount  consideration  in whether  to issue indexed  debt; 
at a minimum,  even  neglecting  social benefits,  the Treasury should  take 
risk-return  tradeoffs into its calculations.  Campbell also took issue  with 
Deborah  Lucas's comment  on the relationship  between  the public's de- 
sire to trade insurance  against inflation and the size of the inflation risk 
premium.  He argued  that even  though  the inflation premium  might be 
small, there could still emerge a well-developed  market in inflation insur- 
ance; he gave as an example the market for hurricane insurance,  which is 
well  developed  and widely  utilized  even  though  the risk is very  small. 
Lucas clarified her argument by noting that, from the Treasury's point of 
view,  a small  inflation  premium  implies  a small potential  reduction  in 
borrowing  costs  from issuing  indexed  debt; it is for the issue  of govern- 
ment borrowing  costs  that the size of the inflation premium is relevant. 